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  PREDICTABILITY OF ARBITRATORS’ 
RELIANCE ON EXTERNAL AUTHORITY? 
ARIANA R. LEVINSON, ERIN O’HARA O’CONNOR, PAIGE MARTA SKIBA* 
ABSTRACT 
Should arbitrators consider authority—such as statutes or case law—external 
to the collective bargaining agreement when deciding labor grievances? Do they 
rely on such external authority? If so, do they do so in particular circumstances 
or in certain types of cases? To provide more insight on this often-debated issue, 
we have amassed a new data set of hundreds of labor arbitration awards 
spanning a decade. In contrast to previous research, we find that the 
overwhelming majority of awards do not cite to any external authority (statutes, 
administrative authorities, case law, or secondary sources). Yet, only a small 
fraction of awards explicitly decline to address a statutory issue or do not address 
external authority cited by one of the parties and mentioned in the award. Other 
significant findings: one or both parties being represented by an attorney in the 
arbitration hearing correlates with citation to external authority. Instances 
where arbitrators are drawn from the American Arbitration Association or the 
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service rosters result in a greater likelihood 
of citation to authority than when arbitrators are selected without aid of a service 
provider. Awards addressing claims asserting a breach of a just-cause provision 
are more likely than other types of contractual claims to cite to external authority. 
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Our new data set differs from prior data sets in that it includes published and 
unpublished awards and cases decided by industrial boards, enabling broader 
study of differing types of labor arbitration. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction .............................................................................. 1829 
     I.    Background .................................................................... 1832 
A.   History of Labor Arbitration ................................... 1832 
B.   The Grievance Arbitration System .......................... 1833 
C.   Labor Awards and the Perceived Fairness of Labor 
Arbitration ............................................................... 1835 
     II.    The External Authority Dilemma ................................ 1837 
A.   The Debate over the Binary Choice ........................ 1838 
B.   The Proposed Middle Ground ................................ 1840 
C.   Others Weigh In ....................................................... 1842 
D.   The Most Recent Proposal ...................................... 1843 
E.   The Inquiry into What Labor Arbitrators Actually 
Consider ................................................................... 1844 
     III.    An Empirical Study of Arbitration Awards ................ 1851 
     IV.    The Research Findings................................................ 1856 
A.   Rates of Citation to External Authority .................. 1856 
1. Citation to statutes.............................................. 1856 
2. Citation to cases .................................................. 1858 
3. Citation to administrative authority .................. 1860 
4. Citation to secondary sources ............................ 1862 
5. Overall citation to external authority ................ 1863 
B.   Attributes of the Arbitration Proceeding that  
May Affect the Likelihood of Citation to  
External Authority ................................................... 1865 
1. Service provider relation to citation to  
external authority ............................................... 1866 
2. Attorney representation relation to citation  
to external authority .......................................... 1866 
C.   Case Type Relation to Citation of External  
Authority .................................................................. 1872 
1. Statutory claims relation to citation to  
external authority ............................................... 1872 
2. Type of claims relation to citation of external 
authority .............................................................. 1875 
Conclusion................................................................................. 1881 
2020] ARBITRATORS’ RELIANCE ON EXTERNAL AUTHORITY 1829 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Should arbitrators consider external authority when deciding labor 
grievances? Do they rely on external authority? If so, do they do so in 
particular circumstances or in certain types of cases? We have amassed 
a new data set of labor arbitration awards to help answer these 
questions. This article reports our findings about whether labor 
arbitration awards from 2000 to 2011 cite to external authority. While 
empirical data cannot, without inference, answer the question of 
whether labor arbitrators should consider external authority, it can 
shed light on whether they do consider external authority. 
Empirical examination can also reveal the factors that enhance the 
likelihood that arbitration awards will cite to external authority. For 
example, perhaps citation to external authority is more likely in cases 
where parties are represented by attorneys than when they are not, or 
when arbitration is conducted by an arbitrator selected via a third-party 
service provider (service provider) rather than an ad hoc arbitrator 
selection process. And perhaps some types of disputes (e.g., statutory 
claims) are more likely to be resolved using external authority than are 
others (e.g., disputes involving the meaning of contract terms). 
When arbitrators ignore external legal authority, outsiders charge 
that this private dispute resolution is lawless. Christopher Drahozal has 
empirically explored the question of whether arbitrators follow the 
law.1 He explores empirical studies of arbitration awards, including of 
labor arbitration awards; surveys of arbitrators; and reversal rates to 
conclude that “[o]verall, the evidence on whether arbitrators follow 
the law in their awards is inconclusive.”2 Citation to external authority, 
such as statutes, cases, and administrative regulations, that we generally 
consider to be law, is one point of information to help answer the 
question.3 
Why care whether or not arbitrators cite legal authority or whether 
arbitration is lawless? Over the decades more and more disputes are 
decided outside of court through alternative dispute resolution, 
including through arbitration. In many settings, an aggrieved individual 
                                               
 1. Christopher R. Drahozal, Is Arbitration Lawless?, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 187, 189–
90 (2006). 
 2. Id. at 194, 203. 
 3. See id. at 195–96 (relying on a study that reviews citation practices to assess 
whether arbitrators follow the law). We focus in this Article on whether arbitrators cite 
external authority, statutes, cases, administrative regulations, and secondary sources, 
which state the law. A later article will address the issue of whether arbitrators cite 
arbitration awards, which may or may not be considered law. 
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or group may never be able to file suit, but must seek relief through 
arbitration instead.4 Many adhesion contracts, and contracts between 
more equal parties, contain arbitration clauses,5 and the Supreme 
Court has mandated the enforcement of arbitration clauses in a broad 
variety of contexts.6 Some argue that this is a positive development 
favoring low-cost, efficient resolution of disputes,7 while others argue 
that claimants in some types of arbitration are deprived of necessary due 
process.8 Lawlessness is a concern because it suggests that arbitration 
can be used to circumvent legal protections designed to aid one of the 
parties or to further public policy.9 
Building on Drahozal’s work, Mark Weidemaier’s 2012 article 
explores four different types of arbitration, including labor arbitration, 
to determine that “the evidence provides little support for the view that 
arbitrators and judges engage in qualitatively different kinds of 
decision-making or opinion-writing.”10 Nearly half of the labor awards 
in Weidemaier’s study cite to a judicial opinion or arbitration award 
and, although only 14.9% cite only to judicial opinions, a higher 
                                               
 4. STEPHEN J. WARE & ARIANA R. LEVINSON, PRINCIPLES OF ARBITRATION LAW 3–4 
(2017). 
 5. Id. at 3–4; FOLBERG ET AL., RESOLVING DISPUTES: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND LAW 
544, 562–63 (2d ed. 2010). 
 6. FOLBERG ET AL., supra note 5, at 551; see, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 
563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011) (upholding clause barring classwide arbitration); Doctor’s 
Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996) (upholding arbitration clause 
under federal law in light of state-law challenge); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. 
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268–69, 282 (1995) (upholding arbitration clause under the 
Federal Arbitration Act’s interstate commerce provision); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson 
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991) (subjecting age discrimination claim to mandatory 
arbitration clause); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
614, 628 (1985) (upholding clause on arbitrating statutory claims); Moses H. Cone 
Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983) (“[A]s a matter of 
federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in 
favor of arbitration . . . .”). 
 7. See David Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher & Michael Heise, Assessing the Case for 
Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1578 
(2005). 
 8. See Kathryn A. Sabbeth & David C. Vladeck, Contracting (Out) Rights, 36 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803, 830 (2009) (discussing how arbitration disproportionately 
benefits defendants); David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 
IND. L.J. 239, 241–42 (2012) (asserting that through removing process costs, primarily 
by limiting discovery, arbitration promotes claim suppression). 
 9. See Drahozal, supra note 1, at 190. 
 10. W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Judging-Lite: How Arbitrators Use and Create Precedent, 90 
N.C. L. REV. 1091, 1091 (2012). 
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percentage cite to both judicial opinions and arbitral awards.11 His 
study also found that labor arbitration may form its own system of 
precedent. Specifically, “[l]abor arbitrators cite past awards more 
frequently, and in greater numbers, than arbitrators in the other 
regimes, and labor arbitrators often justify their decisions by citing only 
other arbitration awards.”12 Thus, his study suggests that while all 
arbitrators generally follow the law expressed in judicial opinions, labor 
arbitrators are more likely to consider arbitral awards than judicial 
decisions. 
There is a long-standing debate in the labor arbitration field about 
whether arbitrators should rely on legal authority.13 Consistent with 
already articulated concerns about lawlessness, some scholars have 
argued that labor arbitrators have a duty to consider and follow 
external authority and to render decisions that are consistent with the 
law.14 At the same time, other preeminent labor arbitrators have long 
argued that arbitrators should not consider authority external to the 
governing contract (i.e., the collective bargaining agreement), 
especially when external authority conflicts with the mandate of the 
contract.15 In the labor arbitration community, this debate is known as 
the Howlett-Meltzer debate, after the two arbitrators who initially 
presented the cogent arguments on each side in 1967.16 In the years since, 
scholars have articulated refined positions, and some have argued that 
the rise in employment laws has made citation to external authority in 
labor arbitration awards unavoidable.17 
                                               
 11. Id. at 1111, 1114 fig.2, 1145 tbl.A-1. 
 12. Id. at 1095. 
 13. See infra Part II.A. 
 14. See, e.g., Robert G. Howlett, The Arbitrator, the NLRB, and the Courts, in NAT’L 
ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS, THE ARBITRATOR, THE NLRB, AND THE COURTS: PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL MEETING 67, 78–79 (Dallas L. Jones ed., 1967) (stating that 
arbitrators should decide on statutory issues where relevant instead of being bound by 
the four corners of the contract). 
 15. See, e.g., Bernard D. Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law, and Labor 
Arbitration, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 557 (1967) (stating that an arbitrator commenting 
on requirements of enacted legislation would exceed the scope of his duties). 
 16. See Philip Baldwin, The External Debate on External Law in Labor Arbitration: Where 
We Stand Five Decades After Meltzer v. Howlett, 16 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 31, 31 (2016); 
Martin H. Malin, Revisiting the Meltzer-Howlett Debate on External Public Law in Labor 
Arbitration: Is It Time for Courts to Declare Howlett the Winner?, 24 LAB. LAW. 1, 5 (2008). 
 17. See Dennis R. Nolan, Disputatio: “Creeping Legalism” as a Declension Myth, 2010 
J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 11 (arguing that the “enormous outpouring” of post-Civil Rights Act 
employment legislation made it nearly impossible to avoid conflicts between contracts 
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Empirical study of labor arbitration like ours can offer a starting 
point for proposals about whether and how to modify other types of 
arbitration, such as securities or employment arbitration, to ensure 
that the law is considered and followed when statutory claims or 
common law claims are at issue. For instance, if, as our data indicates, 
labor arbitrators consider external law more often when attorneys 
represent the parties, then representation could be legislatively 
required in other settings. If, as after some sifting of our data indicates, 
labor arbitrators cite external authority more often for statutory claims, 
examination of external authority and written reasoning could be 
required for those claims. 
Before setting out our detailed empirical findings, we provide 
background about labor arbitration in Part I. In Part II, we set out the 
problem arbitrators face of whether to consider external law, detail the 
debate over whether they should, and report on the few other empirical 
studies of citation to external authority. In Part III, we describe our 
research question and methodology, and then report our empirical 
findings in Part IV before concluding. 
I.    BACKGROUND 
Labor arbitration in the U.S. has a long history, and recent calls to 
prohibit mandatory adhesive arbitration have generally excluded labor 
arbitration. This Part briefly explains the history of labor arbitration, the 
process of the grievance arbitration system, the types of written awards 
in labor arbitration, and the perception of fairness of their results. 
A.   History of Labor Arbitration 
Labor arbitration was used by employers and unions to resolve 
disputes about the meaning of their collective bargaining agreements 
long before the more recent rise in arbitration of statutory employment 
law claims. As early as the 1880s, labor arbitration “was familiar 
enough . . . to be recognized in the laws of a number of states.”18 The 
state laws “simply authorized the courts to appoint local boards of 
arbitration upon the joint request of employers and employees.”19 The 
form of labor arbitration common today, where a neutral umpire decides 
                                               
and external law); Malin, supra note 16, at 15 (stating that arbitrators cannot avoid 
considering the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)). 
 18. DENNIS R. NOLAN & RICHARD A. BALES, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION IN 
A NUTSHELL 5 (3d ed. 2017). 
 19. Id. 
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the dispute, “was routine in the unionized sector of the American 
economy”20 by 1940, when General Motors and the United Automobile 
Workers “substantially revised their arbitration procedure.”21 Arbitration 
often substituted for strikes as a way to resolve workplace disputes, 
leading to less of a breakdown in commerce,22 and also substituted for 
lawsuits over contractual claims.23 
When employees choose union representation, the union is 
authorized to bargain with the employer over the terms and conditions 
of employment.24 The parties negotiate a contract that covers 
workplace issues such as pay, schedules, attendance, leave, benefits, 
and non-discrimination.25 The contract is known as a collective 
bargaining agreement (CBA).26 Most CBAs contain a clause that 
guarantees that discipline, including discharge, will be only for a just 
cause.27 Because outside of the union setting most employees are 
employed at will and can be discharged for any reason or no reason at 
all, just cause is a significant contractual protection for union-
represented employees.28 Labor arbitrators have been settling disputes 
over workplace grievances and the interpretation of CBAs for hundreds 
of years as part of a grievance-arbitration system in unionized workplaces. 
B.   The Grievance Arbitration System 
Most CBAs also include a grievance arbitration provision.29 The 
grievance arbitration process is typically designed to resolve workplace 
                                               
 20. Id. at 6. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 5–6 (noting that Louis Brandeis helped negotiate an agreement to end a 
garment industry strike in 1910 and chaired the resultant Board of Arbitration for a 
decade thereafter). 
 23. Robert G. Howlett, The Role of Law in Arbitration: A Reprise, in NAT’L ACAD. OF 
ARBITRATORS, DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN ARBITRATION: PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING 64, 68–69 (Charles M. Rehmus ed., 1968) (quoting 
Clyde W. Summers, Labor Arbitration: A Private Process with a Public Function, 34 REV. JUR. 
U.P.R. 477, 494 (1965)). 
 24. DOUGLAS E. RAY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING LABOR LAW 155 (3d ed. 2011). 
 25. Id. at 183. 
 26. NOLAN & BALES, supra note 18, at 1. 
 27. WARE & LEVINSON, supra note 4, at 218. 
 28. See RAY ET AL., supra note 24, at 33–35. 
 29. WARE & LEVINSON, supra note 4, at 181; see also Mario F. Bognanno et al., The 
Conventional Wisdom of Discharge Arbitration Outcomes and Remedies: Fact or Fiction, 16 
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 153, 154 (2014). 
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disputes efficiently with less formality than litigation.30 Many involve a 
stepped procedure.31 An example of a hypothetical but representative 
process follows: at the first step of the process the aggrieved employee, 
the grievant, meets with an immediate supervisor to try to resolve the 
issue.32 If the issue is not thereby resolved, a shop steward—an 
employee who volunteers to represent the union, disseminate union 
communications, foster solidarity, and resolve grievances—files a 
formal written grievance on behalf of the grievant and discusses the 
issue with a higher-level supervisor.33 If that meeting does not resolve 
the dispute, then the union business representative and a manager 
meet.34 A business representative is employed by the union to 
represent the employees in contract negotiations and the grievance 
arbitration system.35 Finally, the company president and union 
president meet.36 If the dispute is not resolved through these internal 
steps, which often occur on a tight time frame, then the union can 
advance the dispute to arbitration.37 
Different CBAs provide for different methods of selecting an 
arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. Some CBAs provide for use of a 
service provider, such as the American Arbitration Association (AAA) 
or the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS), to select 
an arbitrator or a panel of three arbitrators.38 The service provider 
gives the parties a list of names,39 and the parties indicate their 
preferences, which the service accounts for in assigning an arbitrator.40 
Some CBAs may provide that the parties obtain a list from a service 
provider, but then take turns striking arbitrators from the list until one 
arbitrator remains.41 CBAs can specify the names of several arbitrators 
and the parties may rotate through them or pick by striking arbitrator 
                                               
 30. RAY, ET AL., supra note 24, at 290 (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 
415 U.S. 36, 57–58 (1974)). 
 31. WARE & LEVINSON, supra note 4, at 206. 
 32. WARE & LEVINSON, supra note 4, at 206. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id.; see also Douglas E. Ray, Protecting the Parties’ Bargain After Misco: Court Review 
of Labor Arbitration Awards, 64 IND. L.J. 1, 1 n.2 (1988). 
 38. WARE & LEVINSON, supra note 4, at 207–08. 
 39. Id. at 207. 
 40. Id. at 208. 
 41. Id. 
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names for each dispute.42 CBAs might also specify one particular 
arbitrator for all disputes, and some may simply provide for the parties 
to pick an arbitrator on a case by case basis.43 
CBAs may contain an additional step before arbitration, which is the 
joint arbitration board.44 This board is usually composed of an equal 
number of employer or industry representatives and union representatives.45 
They are normally not attorneys.46 If the dispute is resolved by the joint 
arbitration board, the decision is binding as an arbitration award.47 In 
some CBAs the joint arbitration board constitutes the final step of 
arbitration.48 
Even those arbitrators who are selected using a service provider or 
are included as a named arbitrator or panel of arbitrators in a CBA 
may not have JDs.49 Some have PhDs in labor relations or related fields, 
while some have accrued expertise working in a particular unionized 
industry.50 
C.   Labor Awards and the Perceived Fairness of Labor Arbitration 
Just as the level of formality of judicial opinions varies from court to 
court and judge to judge, the level of formality of labor awards varies 
                                               
 42. Id. at 207–08. 
 43. See id. at 208 (stating that because arbitration is contractual, CBAs can specify 
a variety of processes for selecting an arbitrator). 
 44. See, e.g., Cemetery Stone Handlers, Local No. 106, 1954 Lab. Arb. LEXIS 55, at 
*3 (1954). 
 45. See, e.g., Drywall Tapers v. Xtreme Drywall & Acoustics, No. 16-CV-5172, 2017 
WL 3088912, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2017); Cemetery Stone Handlers, 1954 Lab. Arb. 
LEXIS 55, at *3. 
 46. See generally Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Lawyers, Non-Lawyers and Mediation: 
Rethinking the Professional Monopoly from a Problem-Solving Perspective, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. 
REV. 235, 255 n.83 (2002) (“Non-lawyers have a long history of serving as arbitrators in 
this country.”). 
 47. See, e.g., Drywall Tapers, 2017 WL 3088912, at *2. But see Cemetery Stone 
Handlers, 1954 Lab. Arb. LEXIS 55, at *3–4 (finding a joint board decision 
unenforceable where a party had right to invoke arbitration thereafter). 
 48. See, e.g., Drywall Tapers, 2017 WL 3088912, at *2 (noting that the CBA at issue 
contained no right to appeal). 
 49. Michel Picher, Ronald L. Seeber & David B. Lipsky, The Arbitration Profession in 
Transition: A Survey of the National Academy of Arbitrators, in NAT’L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS, 
ARBITRATION 2000: WORKPLACE JUSTICE AND EFFICIENCY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-THIRD ANNUAL MEETING 12 (Steven Briggs & Jay E. Grenig 
eds., 2001) [hereinafter NAT’L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS, ARBITRATION 2000] (stating that 
61.4% of NAA arbitrators in 1999 had a law or JD degree). 
 50. See id. 
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across arbitrators. Many arbitrators who are members of the National 
Academy of Arbitrators (NAA) or who appear on the rosters of service 
providers author written opinions supporting their award in each 
case.51 They often follow a traditional format where they begin by 
stating the issue, describe each party’s position and arguments on the 
issue, discuss the reasons supporting their resolution, and conclude 
with the award, which specifies who prevails and what remedy, if any, 
is awarded.52 Some arbitrators, however, will write shorter opinions and 
awards.53 Joint arbitration boards may announce awards orally and 
memorialize them in a short document or letter.54 
Whatever the process, it is worth noting that recent calls to prohibit 
adhesive arbitration have generally excluded labor arbitration, which 
is often perceived to be fairer than employment arbitration. For 
example, both the Arbitration Fairness Act55 and the more recent Restoring 
Justice for Workers Act56 proposed a prohibition on enforcement of pre-
dispute arbitration agreements in the employment and consumer 
settings.57 Despite the concern that arbitration fails to provide adequate 
                                               
 51. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, LABOR ARBITRATION RULES 17 (2013), 
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Labor%20Rules.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3FWT-MCY2] (“The parties shall advise the AAA whenever they do 
not require the arbitrator to accompany the award with an opinion.”); Weidemaier, 
supra note 10, at 1102. 
 52. See JAY E. GRENIG & ROCCO M. SCANZA, FUNDAMENTALS OF LABOR ARBITRATION 
75 (2011); see, e.g., Pub. Sch. Emps. of Wash. v. W. Wash. Univ. (2007) (Duffy, Arb.), 
http://www.duffyadr.com/pdf/decision1a.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WRN-N7XP]; 
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 305 v. Unified W. Grocers, Inc. (2007) (Duffy, Arb.), 
http://www.duffyadr.com/pdf/decision2.pdf [https://perma.cc/U45Q-FQHG]; 
Attachment to Complaint, Am. Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., No. 
05- 1430, 2006 WL 2787836 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2006), https://www.bloomberg 
law.com/product/blaw/document/XH92302TG091V8JO6VOUDFURO8?document
Name=1.pdf&fmt=pdf. 
 53. In our data set, 26% of awards decided by a single neutral arbitrator selected 
without assistance of a service provider included some explanation of their thinking 
but did not include a full opinion. Of the awards decided without assistance of a service 
provider (which includes joint boards and panels of neutral arbitrators), 31% included 
some explanation of their thinking but did not include a full opinion. 
 54. See, e.g., Attachment to Counterclaim at 28, 31, 34, 37, 40, 43, 46, 49, 52, 
Merryman Excavation, Inc. v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 150, No. 06-C-
5160, 2010 WL 187241 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 2010), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/ 
product/blaw/document/X3JRS7P5O5193E8HMP4OMG18D21?documentName=8
8.xml. 
 55. S. 2591, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 56. H.R. 7109, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 57. S. 2591 § 402(a); H.R. 7109 § 402(a)(1)–(2). 
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protection for workers, both of these proposed federal laws exclude 
labor arbitration from their scope. This exclusion is no mere oversight; 
both explicitly permit arbitration provisions in CBAs between unions 
and employers with the caveat that “no such arbitration provision shall 
have the effect of waiving the right of an employee to seek judicial 
enforcement” of a constitutional or statutory right.58 The exclusion of 
labor arbitration from the prohibition indicates general satisfaction 
with the use of labor arbitration to resolve some workplace disputes, 
yet it also reflects concern or dissatisfaction with the use of labor 
arbitration to enforce discrimination and other constitutional and 
statutory claims. 
II.    THE EXTERNAL AUTHORITY DILEMMA 
Labor arbitrators are faced with a basic choice between restricting 
their analysis to interpreting the CBA on its own terms59 or considering 
additional authority.60 For example, given that many employment law 
claims involve statutes, arbitrators might wish to consult and cite to 
them. Common examples of applicable federal employment law 
statutes include the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act.61 In fact, a debate among labor 
arbitrators has long raged over whether they should consider statutes, 
particularly to ensure that their decisions comply with governing law.62 
Generally, if a CBA contains an anti-discrimination clause, a worker can 
both grieve a discriminatory discharge as a contract violation and bring 
an employment discrimination suit based on a statutory violation.63 
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett64 in 2009, 
                                               
 58. S. 2591 § 402(b)(2); H.R. 7109 § 402(d)(2). By inclusion of this provision, the 
legislation would overturn 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 251 (2009). 
 59. See Meltzer, supra note 15, at 557. 
 60. See Howlett, supra note 14, at 78–79. 
 61. See Malin, supra note 16, at 4–7, 15. 
 62. Id. at 5–6. 
 63. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51–52 (1974) (stating that 
both courses of action “have legally independent origins and are equally available to 
the aggrieved employee”). 
 64. 556 U.S. 247 (2009). 
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CBAs can clearly and unmistakably waive the right to go to court and 
require the statutory claim be brought in arbitration.65 
A labor arbitrator might consider other sources of law, such as 
administrative regulations, or court decisions interpreting a statute or 
common law.66 These sources can assist the arbitrator with both 
statutory and non-statutory claims. Furthermore, the arbitrator might 
consult or cite one or more secondary sources to edify her understanding 
of governing legal principles. 
External authority can be useful outside the context of statutory 
claims. For example, labor arbitrators might look at external authority 
for guidance on how to interpret or otherwise give meaning to a 
certain CBA provision, such as a good faith or just-cause requirement.67 
Or labor arbitrators might look at external authority because the CBA 
specifically incorporates external law or a choice-of-law provision.68 
A.   The Debate over the Binary Choice 
Labor arbitrators have long debated the relevance of external law to 
their decisions. The disagreement crystalized in a debate between 
Bernard Meltzer and Robert Howlett at the NAA annual meeting in 
1967.69 Meltzer called for arbitrators to interpret the contract, without 
regard to external law, in cases where there is “an irrepressible conflict” 
between the CBA’s requirements and those of external law.70 In other 
                                               
 65. Id. at 251 (2009). An area ripe for further research would be to update the 
findings of this Article with more recent awards to determine if Pyett had any significant 
impact on the citation of external authority by labor arbitrators. 
 66. See Margaret Oppenheimer & Helen LaVan, Arbitration Awards in Discrimination 
Disputes: An Empirical Analysis, 34 ARB. J. 12, 13 (1979); see also Benjamin W. Wolkinson 
& Dennis H. Liberson, The Arbitration of Sex Discrimination Grievances, 37 ARB. J. 35, 43–
44 (1982) (analyzing the congruency between decisions of arbitrators, the courts, and 
the EEOC in sex discrimination cases). 
 67. Cf. Meltzer, supra note 15, at 557 (noting arbitrators should consider 
regulation as one factor when interpreting a loosely formulated standard like “just 
cause” or adopt a contractual interpretation consistent with the law when a provision 
is “susceptible to two interpretations”); Theodore J. St. Antoine, External Law in 
Arbitration: Hard-Boiled, Soft-Boiled, and Sunny-Side up, in NAT’L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS, 
ARBITRATION 2004: NEW ISSUES AND INNOVATIONS IN WORKPLACE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING 185, 188 (Charles J. Coleman ed., 
2005) (footnote omitted) (“Everyone seems to agree, including the Supreme Court, 
that an arbitrator may look to the law for guidance in interpreting a contractual 
provision.”). 
 68. See Wolkinson & Liberson, supra note 66, at 44. 
 69. See Baldwin, supra note 16, at 31. 
 70. Meltzer, supra note 15, at 557. 
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words, “respect the agreement and ignore the law.”71 For an arbitrator 
to do otherwise would require exceeding the granted contractual 
authority to interpret the contract,72 and it would potentially require 
nonlawyers to interpret the law.73 Finally, Meltzer reasoned that if 
arbitrators considered the law in cases where the law appeared to 
conflict with the requirements of the contract, “they would be 
impinging on an area in which courts or other official tribunals are 
granted plenary authority,” rendering “limited judicial review” wholly 
inappropriate.74 
Howlett argued, in contrast, that arbitrators should consider 
external law in addition to the contract language in order to avoid 
issuing awards that require unlawful action.75 Some background about 
the National Labor Relations Act76 (NLRA) and the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) is necessary to fully appreciate Howlett’s 
argument. The NLRA prohibits employers and unions from 
committing unfair labor practices.77 For instance, an employer cannot 
discriminate against an employee for engaging in union activity or 
collective action to improve working conditions,78 and employers must 
bargain in good faith with the union before making changes to 
working conditions.79 A CBA may, and often does, contain parallel 
protections, such as a clause prohibiting anti-union discrimination.80 
Alternatively, sometimes the CBA limits legal protections, such as by 
permitting an employer to change certain working conditions without 
bargaining with the union.81 In these circumstances, a single factual 
dispute can give rise to both a grievance under the CBA and an unfair 
labor practice charge filed with the NLRB.82 
Howlett’s article presented at the twentieth annual NAA meeting 
suggested that arbitrators should probe for statutory NLRA issues that 
                                               
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 558. 
 74. Id. at 558–59. 
 75. Howlett, supra note 14, at 78–79; see also Howlett, supra note 23, at 69 (“As a 
substitute for the courts, [arbitrators] apply the law as well as the language of a 
document being construed or interpreted.”). 
 76. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2018). 
 77. See § 158. 
 78. § 158(a)(1), (3). 
 79. § 158(a)(5). 
 80. WARE & LEVINSON, supra note 4, at 182. 
 81. See RAY, supra note 24, at 305–06 (4th ed. 2014). 
 82. Id. 
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need resolution.83 Howlett reasoned that while “in theory” the roles of 
the arbitrator and the NLRB are “mutually exclusive,” in reality 
“‘disputes are often difficult to classify’ and in some controversies a 
‘blurred line . . . often exists.’”84 He argued that arbitrators are bound 
by the law, and that all contracts include “all applicable law.”85 If an 
award fails to consider the external law that circumscribes CBA’s, it 
risks resulting in an error.86 Howlett was unconcerned with the 
prospect of nonlawyers addressing legal issues; after all, many NLRB 
agents who must interpret and apply the law are not attorneys.87 
In a follow-up paper, Howlett argued that, as to non-NLRA legal 
issues, arbitrators have the time and energy to research the law and 
their expertise in labor disputes makes them more knowledgeable than 
judges.88 Moreover, while labor arbitration is viewed as a substitute for a 
strike, it is also a “substitute for the courts.”89 If involving arbitrators in 
legal decisions results in more extensive judicial review of arbitral 
decisions (traditionally limited to lack of jurisdiction, fraud, or 
corruption), Howlett embraced the change to prevent mistakes.90 
B.   The Proposed Middle Ground 
Soon after this debate took shape, Richard Mittenthal proposed a 
“middle ground” position91—that an award may “permit conduct 
forbidden by law but . . . not require conduct forbidden by law.”92 He 
began by explaining that where the parties have incorporated statutory 
provisions into their contract, an arbitrator’s proper response is to 
refer to the relevant legislation.93 In addition, when a CBA uses general 
language, an arbitrator should consider relevant materials such as a 
                                               
 83. Howlett, supra note 14, at 92. 
 84. Id. at 70 (quoting Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 268–69 
(1964)). 
 85. Id. at 83. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 105. 
 88. Howlett, supra note 23, at 68. 
 89. Id. at 68–69 (quoting Clyde W. Summers, Labor Arbitration: A Private Process with 
a Public Function, 34 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 477, 494 (1965)). 
 90. Id. at 73. 
 91. Richard Mittenthal, The Role of Law in Arbitration, in NAT’L ACAD. OF 
ARBITRATORS, DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN ARBITRATION: PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING, 42, 42. 
 92. Id. at 50. 
 93. Id. at 42–43. 
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statute.94 If terms of the CBA are vague, the arbitrator should interpret 
them in a way that harmonizes the contract with the law.95 
However, Mittenthal refuted Howlett’s claim that the law is implied 
in every CBA. First, he asserted that that premise rests on a fiction, 
because judges first determine the meaning of a contract and only then 
fashion the remedy to comply with law.96 Second, arbitrators derive 
their authority from the parties’ contract and not from public law, as 
judges do, and so should follow the intent of the parties over the 
requirements of the law.97 Reference to governing law could prove 
particularly problematic where the CBA makes no mention of potentially 
conflicting law.98 Mittenthal argued that in these cases the arbitrator 
should be able to resolve the contractual issue without consideration of 
the law.99 
Consider, for example, a dispute where the CBA requires seniority 
in a layoff based on actual time worked but governing law requires 
seniority for veterans during a layoff. Under Mittenthal’s approach, the 
arbitrator would deny the veteran’s grievance because the employer 
had followed the CBA, and the veteran could pursue his statutory 
remedy separately in federal court.100 
Despite this conclusion, Mittenthal stopped short of agreeing with 
Meltzer that an arbitrator should follow only the contract and ignore 
the law.101 Pragmatically, parties can pick arbitrators with legal expertise 
when law is an issue, quashing Meltzer’s concern that arbitrators lack 
legal expertise.102 Moreover, Mittenthal asserted that ignoring the law 
undermines the contract because contracts routinely are formed with 
reference to external law.103 Parties generally “do not wish to be bound 
by an invalid provision” and often include a separability or saving 
clause in their CBA.104 Furthermore, wholly ignoring legal mandates 
potentially invites noncompliance with the award (on the part of an 
                                               
 94. Id. at 43. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 43–44. 
 97. Id. at 46. 
 98. Id. at 50. 
 99. Id. at 54. 
 100. Id. at 54–55. 
 101. Id. at 48–49. 
 102. Id. at 48. 
 103. Id. at 49. 
 104. Id. at 49. These clauses direct the separation of any unlawful provision from 
the agreement and the enforcement of the remaining lawful portions. Id. 
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employer who is reluctant to violate the law),105 and such noncompliance 
interferes with parties’ desire that arbitration awards be final and 
binding.106 For example, in the scenario described above, if the 
company had retained the veteran, and the non-veteran with more 
seniority had grieved, it would be problematic for the arbitrator to 
strictly follow the CBA thereby requiring the employer to violate the 
veteran-preference law. 
C.   Others Weigh In 
This debate has continued to the present. David Feller supports 
Meltzer’s view, arguing that “[e]xternal law is irrelevant even where the 
collective bargaining agreement has terms that look very much like a 
statute.”107 Ted St. Antoine also sides with Meltzer,108 but he 
acknowledges that “[c]ases of a truly irreconcilable conflict between 
contract and law are probably quite rare.”109 He reasons that court 
decisions do not “prohibit arbitrators from looking at external law in 
their decisions” but rather prohibit “relying solely on external law 
instead of the contract.”110 Indeed, one of the few grounds upon which 
a court can reverse a labor arbitration award is where the award is not 
grounded in the language of the CBA.111 
In contrast, Marty Malin has sided with Howlett.112 He argues that 
because of developments since the 1967 debate, arbitrators must be 
able to, and should, rely on external public law.113 Malin discusses three 
relevant developments, the first being that “a significant minority” of 
courts now require employees to rely on their CBA’s grievance and 
                                               
 105. Id. at 50. 
 106. Id. 
 107. David E. Feller, Arbitration and the External Law Revisited, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
973, 975 (1993). 
 108. Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Use and Abuse of Precedent in Labor and Employment 
Arbitration, 52 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 431, 438 (2014) [hereinafter St. Antoine, Use and 
Abuse of Precedent]; see also Theodore J. St. Antoine, Presidential Address: Contract Reading 
Revisited, in NAT’L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS, ARBITRATION 2000, supra note 49, at 1, 15–16 
(asserting that an arbitrator should follow the contract rather than external law where 
a conflict between the two arises). 
 109. St. Antoine, Use and Abuse of Precedent, supra note 108, at 439. 
 110. Id. at 440. 
 111. Id. at 439–40. 
 112. See generally Malin, supra note 16, at 3 (urging courts to endorse Howlett’s 
position on enforcing arbitration awards that rely on external law). 
 113. Id. at 14 (emphasizing how changes in employment law and labor arbitration 
have spurred the need to rely on external law). 
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arbitration procedure to bring public law claims.114 Second, even more 
courts are relying on an arbitration award “unfavorable to the employee 
as a basis for granting summary judgment against the employee in 
subsequent public law claims litigation.”115 Finally, following its enactment 
in 1993, labor arbitrators must now consider the FMLA.116 The FMLA 
grants a right to leave for a serious health condition and prohibits 
employers from using the leave adversely in employment actions. 
Accordingly, arbitrators frequently resolve disputes over discipline or 
discharge resulting from attendance infractions and must consider plans 
that are required to comply with the FMLA.117 
Dennis Nolan agrees with Malin that today arbitrators simply cannot 
ignore the law.118 Parties “incorporated statutory law into their 
agreements either expressly or impliedly.”119 In more instances, both 
parties, rather than just one, “began to argue legal questions,” making 
it much more difficult for an arbitrator to refuse to consider external 
law.120 
D.   The Most Recent Proposal 
Most recently, Philip Baldwin argued that Meltzer’s position has 
become indefensible in light of new developments in labor and 
employment law.121 Baldwin points to a “proliferation of employment 
law statutes,”122 a shift in Supreme Court jurisprudence toward strongly 
deferring to arbitrators’ statutory interpretations,123 and an increase in 
the proportion of arbitrators who are educated in law.124 Baldwin aims 
to help labor arbitrators by “articulating an approach that allows for 
measured consideration of external law to an extent that was wholly 
                                               
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 14–15. 
 116. Id. at 15. 
 117. Id. at 25–26. 
 118. Nolan, supra note 17, at 11 (“[T]he enormous outpouring of laws regulating 
employment . . . made it almost impossible to avoid potential conflicts between contracts 
and external law.”). 
 119. Id. 
 120. See id. at 11–12. 
 121. Baldwin, supra note 16 at 31. 
 122. Id. at 31, 39 (stating many employment statutes had either just been 
promulgated, or had yet to be promulgated, at the time of the 1967 debate). 
 123. See id. at 40 (noting that the perception of arbitral incompetency that 
supported the “‘traditional’ approach” is no longer endorsed by the Court). 
 124. See id. at 46 (highlighting that studies have found that labor arbitrators are as 
competent as judges to handle legal questions). 
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unorthodox” at the time of the Meltzer-Howlett debate.125 Baldwin 
proposes four guidelines for labor arbitrators to use to “reconcile the 
collective bargaining agreement with external law”:126 
1. Labor arbitrators should consider external law rather than 
interpreting the CBA in isolation.127 
2. Labor arbitrators should interpret the CBA using an extremely 
strong “presumption of legality.”128 
3. Labor arbitrators should not consider external law sua sponte, 
instead addressing external law only when raised by a party.129 
4. Labor arbitrators should not assume every requirement of an 
external law is incorporated in the CBA.130 
Baldwin’s article explains that even when a CBA “expressly incorporate[s] 
a statute,” arbitrators should assume only the broad goals of the statute, and 
not every detail of the statute, have been incorporated.131 Arbitrators should 
not require illegal conduct, but should rely on the CBA over external law 
if the CBA permits, rather than requires, illegal conduct.132 
E.   The Inquiry into What Labor Arbitrators Actually Consider 
While labor law scholars and labor arbitrators have extensively 
debated whether arbitrators should consider external authority, much 
less has been written about whether labor arbitrators do actually 
consider external authority. And much of what has been written on the 
latter inquiry is not recent. 
In a 1975 study, Harry T. Edwards sent a questionnaire to the 
members of the NAA, and 200 of the 409 recipients responded.133 The 
                                               
 125. Id. at 31. 
 126. Id. at 50. 
 127. See id. at 51–52 (noting that arbitrators must supplement the contract with 
external law to carry out the parties’ true intentions). 
 128. See id. at 52 (asserting that arbitrators should take extra care to issue an award 
that complies with the law). 
 129. Id. at 54 (noting that the arbitrator as a neutral adjudicator should wait for a 
party to raise the issue, even if he or she notices a potential conflict). 
 130. Id. at 56. 
 131. Id. (quoting Richard I. Bloch, The Changing Face of Just Cause: One Standard or 
Many?, in NAT’L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS, ARBITRATION 2000, supra note 49, at 37). 
 132. Id. at 57 (noting that if illegal conduct is simply permitted rather than 
required, the arbitrator “is not forcing anyone to be a two-time loser or law breaker”). 
 133. Harry T. Edwards, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Cases: An Empirical 
Study, in NAT’L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS, ARBITRATION—1975: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
TWENTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING 59, 70 (Barbara D. Dennis & Gerald G. Somers eds., 
1976). 
2020] ARBITRATORS’ RELIANCE ON EXTERNAL AUTHORITY 1845 
 
study “attempted to determine . . . the extent to which arbitrators are 
competent to handle ‘legal’ issues in employment discrimination 
cases.”134 The survey found that 77% of the respondents had read judicial 
opinions involving Title VII discrimination claims, 16% had never read 
judicial opinions involving discrimination claims, and 7% declined to 
answer.135 Additionally, 52% indicated that they read “labor advance 
sheets, a type of secondary source,136 to keep abreast of current 
developments under Title VII,” while 40% indicated they did not, and 
8% declined to answer.137 
Overall, the survey found that close to two thirds of arbitrators who 
responded believe that an arbitrator’s role in a contractual grievance 
dispute does not include applying or interpreting statutes.138 Nearly all 
of the subset of respondents “conceded that there were certain 
exceptions to this rule.” Of the subset, 85% agreed that an arbitrator 
may consider public law “to avoid compelling” a party “to do 
something that is clearly unlawful.”139 Ninety-five percent “agreed that 
an arbitrator” may refer to governing law if “the parties have intentionally 
adopted a contract clause . . . with the object of incorporating the body 
of public law into the contract.”140 Additionally, 97% agreed that an 
arbitrator should “should consider public law when the parties have, 
by submission, conferred jurisdiction” upon the arbitrator “to decide 
the contract issue in light of the applicable federal or state law.”141 One-
third of the overall respondents believed that “a collective bargaining 
agreement must be read to include by reference all public law applicable 
thereto.”142 
In 1979, Margaret Oppenheimer and Helen LaVan examined labor 
arbitration awards in disputes involving employment discrimination.143 
The data set consisted of all employment “discrimination cases from 
                                               
 134. Id. at 71. 
 135. Id. 
  136. Advance sheets would summarize recent court and administrative decisions. 
See UNIV. OF IDAHO COLL. OF LAW, Employment & Labor Law, https://www.uidaho.edu/-
/media/UIdaho-Responsive/Files/law/library/legal-research/guides/employment-
labor-law.pdf [https://perma.cc/6URW-XKD2] (describing advance sheets as a 
common feature of employment and labor law reporters). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 79. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Oppenheimer & LaVan, supra note 66, at 12. 
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March 1973 through November 1975” published in the Bureau of 
National Affairs (BNA) Labor Arbitration Reports, a total of 86 cases.144 
Arbitrators cited “federal or state law or EEOC guidelines” 60% of the 
time, judicial decisions 40% of the time, and other arbitration awards 
35% of the time.145 Of these three categories of citation to external 
authority, 17% of the arbitrators cited all three in their awards, while 
an additional 28% cited two of the three.146 The analysis found that 
citation to federal or state law or EEOC guidelines was higher in cases 
where the grievant prevailed, discrimination was found, or back pay 
was awarded.147 There was no significant relationship between these 
types of cases and citation to judicial decisions and other arbitration 
awards, except for a low correlation to an award of back pay.148 
Although roughly two-thirds of the arbitrators were lawyers, it had no 
effect on the variables used to reach a decision and was not related to 
the means by which arbitrators justified their decisions.149 The article 
concludes that arbitrators who are attorneys may not be more qualified 
to hear discrimination cases based on a legal background alone, and 
that other qualifications such as “familiarity with the industry and 
discrimination law . . . may be more relevant.”150 
Benjamin Wolkinson and Dennis Liberson reviewed labor arbitration 
cases involving certain types of sex discrimination cases from the BNA 
Labor Arbitration Reports from 1975 to 1980.151 They concluded that 
many arbitrators adopted Howlett’s position “that every agreement 
implicitly incorporated all applicable law”152 and cited to judicial 
decisions and EEOC guidance.153 The article concluded that “some 
arbitrators still adhere to the position advocated by . . . Meltzer that 
arbitrators . . . should . . . respect the agreement and ignore the law,” 
while others “apply the law if there exists a definitive judicial decision 
bearing on the issue.”154 
                                               
 144. Id. at 13. 
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 147. Id. at 15. 
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 151. Wolkinson & Liberson, supra note 66, at 36. 
 152. Id. at 44. 
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Perry A. Zirkel examined “a random sample of 100 arbitration 
awards” from the BNA Labor Arbitration Reports from 1972 to 1982.155 
He found that only 5% of awards involved “interpretation of legal and 
other precedent.”156 These five awards did not correlate with 
arbitrators being attorneys or representatives being attorneys.157 He 
determined that, in addition to these five cases, in seven other cases, 
court decisions and other authority played a secondary role, and he 
determined that court decisions or a statute played a secondary role in 
two additional cases.158 He concluded that “external law and arbitral 
authority played at least a secondary role in almost half . . . of the 
cases.”159 He also concluded that “a solid third of the cases do not involve 
any trace of the law, even merely in terminology or technique.”160 
Patricia Greenfield examined arbitrators’ treatment of external law 
in 106 arbitration awards decided between 1980 and 1985.161 The cases 
were selected because at least one of the parties had filed an unfair 
labor practice charge, meaning the statute at issue was the NLRA.162 
Her study found that fifty-five of the 106 cases “cite statutory issues” in 
the discussion section of the opinion, rather than only in the section 
reciting the parties’ positions.163 Arbitrators were more likely to cite 
statutory issues when the arbitrator was aware of a related unfair labor 
practice charge and/or when at least one of the parties argued a 
statutory issue.164 In addition, the type of case significantly impacted 
the likelihood of the arbitrator addressing a statutory issue.165 In cases 
alleging discrimination against an employee because of union activity, 
termed “Section 8(a)(3) cases” because of the applicable section of the 
NLRA, arbitrators were more likely to address statutory issues.166 They 
                                               
 155. Perry A. Zirkel, The Use of External Law in Labor Arbitration: An Analysis of Arbitral 
Awards, 1985 DET. C.L. REV. 31, 38. 
 156. Id. at 41. 
 157. Id. at 42. 
 158. Id. at 43. 
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 160. Id. at 45. 
 161. Patricia A. Greenfield, How Do Arbitrators Treat External Law?, 45 INDUS. & LAB. 
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did so in thirty-five of forty-nine, or 71.4%, of the Section 8(a)(3) 
cases.167 
Arbitrators were significantly less likely to cite statutory issues in cases 
alleging a refusal by an employer to bargain with the union, termed 
“Section 8(a)(5) cases.”168 Arbitrators addressed the statutory issue in 
only twelve of the thirty-one, or 38.7%, of the Section 8(a)(5) cases.169 
Of the fifty-five cases raising statutory issues, fourteen cited NLRB 
decisions,170 which would be approximately 25% of the cases raising 
statutory issues and approximately 13% of the total 106 awards studied. 
One of the primary conclusions of the article is that the majority of the 
awards studied did not “create a record adequate for review” by the 
NLRB, which had deferred its decision to the arbitrator.171 Despite 
some exceptions, many arbitrators and NLRB Administrative Law 
Judges dispose of cases after failing to address statutory issues sufficiently, 
if at all.172 
Dale Allen and Daniel Jennings surveyed the 641 members of the 
NAA in 1987 and received 296 usable questionnaires.173 The 
questionnaire asked the arbitrators to rank the importance of different 
decision-making criteria.174 Of the seven factors, arbitrators ranked 
state and federal law lowest.175 Allen and Jennings noted that “[i]n the 
majority of arbitration cases,” the law has no bearing on the issue and 
many arbitrators believe that they should “restrict themselves merely 
to examination of the labor agreement.”176 Further, 88% of the 
arbitrators do not consult published labor awards “in the majority of 
decisions,” and 64% “state that the use of precedent is not significant 
except for about one-third of the cases.”177 
Ted St. Antoine reported the results of a survey of NAA arbitrators 
about their use of external authority in a 2004 article.178 He opened 
the article with the still valid observation that, “Meltzer and . . . Howlett 
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 173. A. Dale Allen, Jr. & Daniel F. Jennings, Sounding out the Nation’s Arbitrators: An 
NAA Survey, 39 LAB. L.J. 423, 423 (1988). 
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squared off at our annual meeting in a classic confrontation on an issue 
that refuses to die. What should an arbitrator do when there is a 
seemingly irreconcilable conflict between a provision of a collective 
bargaining agreement and the dictates of external law?”179 He concluded 
that a cross-section of NAA members accept Meltzer’s position, “but 
when the going gets tough, most of them move over into” Mittenthal’s 
middle-ground approach.180 St. Antoine requested via the NAA’s 
unofficial email list that the approximately 240 members complete a 
questionnaire, and fifty-two members responded.181 The results indicated 
that: 
• About half of the arbitrators will cite external law only if the 
parties have cited legal authorities.182 
• About 30% of the arbitrators will cite external law, even if the 
parties have not, “when it seems especially pertinent.”183 
• Around 60% of respondents noted they “seldom feel required 
to deal with the issue of contract versus law” because the “vast 
majority of contracts should and can be interpreted as 
consistent with the law.”184 
• When the contract and external law irreconcilably conflict, 
“almost twice as many arbitrators said they would follow the 
contract, unless the parties instructed them otherwise, as said 
they would follow the law.”185 
• Almost 60% “would not order a party to violate external law as 
part of their award.”186 
These responses indicate labor arbitrators’ varied approaches to 
resolving disputes with external law. 
A 2005 article by Malin and Jeanne Vonhof addresses how arbitrators 
should deal with parties’ expectations that prior FMLA-protected leave 
should not be subject to attack in an arbitration regarding a later 
attendance violation.187 While Malin and Vonhof do not specifically 
address how often arbitrators cite external authority, such as the 
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FMLA, they note that “parties’ expectations are evolving” because of 
the “pervasive influence of the FMLA.”188 Further, they noted that to 
the extent parties expect FMLA issues to be addressed by arbitrators, 
there is no longer a conflict between traditional expectations that 
arbitrators will interpret the contract as written and what the law 
requires.189 Malin also noted that arbitrators decide cases involving the 
FMLA by relying on its provisions and the Department of Labor 
regulations “without regard to whether the collective bargaining 
agreement says anything about the FMLA.”190 
In a 2012 article, Mark Weidemaier explored how often labor awards 
published by BNA cited external authority.191 He examined 208 
randomly selected awards192 and found that approximately 48.6% of 
the awards cited to either a judicial opinion or another arbitration 
award.193 Of those arbitrators, 76.2% cited “at least one arbitration 
award,” 35.6% cited arbitration awards but not judicial opinions, and 
14.9% cited only judicial opinions.194 Looking more closely at a subset 
of twenty-five awards, the study indicates that the average number of 
citations to judicial opinions or labor awards was 8.7 unique citations, 
with an average of 3.9 being to judicial opinions and 4.5 to arbitration 
awards.195 The awards cited an average of “two or more unique 
precedents per page of legal analysis.”196 Of these citations, an average 
of 2.3 “discussed the cited source in some detail or explicitly indicated 
reliance on the source.”197 In other words, the arbitrators “did more 
than pepper their awards with string citations.”198 
In a 2013 article, Levinson explored how often labor arbitration 
awards in discrimination cases published by BNA Labor Arbitration 
Reports relied on different forms of external authority.199 From a total 
of 111 awards involving statutory claims, forty “cited only the relevant 
                                               
 188. Id. at 200. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Malin, supra note 16, at 26 (quoting FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, 
HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 520 (Alan Myles Rubin ed., 6th ed. 2003)). 
 191. Weidemaier, supra note 10, at 1101. 
 192. Id. at 1104–05. 
 193. Id. at 1111. 
 194. Id. at 1126. 
 195. Id. at 1120–21. 
 196. Id. at 1121. 
 197. Id. at 1121–22. 
 198. Id. at 1121. 
 199. See Ariana R. Levinson, What the Awards Tell Us About Labor Arbitration of 
Employment-Discrimination Claims, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 789, 830 (2013). 
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statute or no legal authority.”200 Seventy-one cited to external authority 
other than the statute involved.201 Fifty-two cited judicial opinions, 
thirteen cited EEOC guidelines or regulations, and twenty-six cited other 
arbitral awards.202 Seventeen awards cited a treatise or other secondary 
source.203 Thus, approximately 64% of the awards cited to external 
legal authority of some kind, and 47% to judicial opinions. 
III.    AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF ARBITRATION AWARDS 
In this article, we investigate whether labor arbitrators actually are 
considering statutes and other external authority, and to what extent. 
Then, to the extent possible, we explore whether they did so in certain 
types of cases. For instance, are arbitrators more likely to consider 
external authority in cases involving statutory claims than those for 
breach of the CBA? Are they more likely to consider external authority 
in cases involving breach of just-cause provisions than in other breach 
of CBA claims? 
Perhaps attributes of the particular arbitrator affect whether or not 
they consider external authority. Some labor arbitrators do not have a 
JD, so might not consult external law because they do not have formal 
legal training. While data on the topic is sparse, as of 2000, 61.4% of 
NAA arbitrators had JDs,204 and a study of eighty-one labor arbitrators’ 
awards issued between 1982 and 2005 found approximately 64.2% had 
JDs.205 Our data set includes decisions made by joint arbitration boards, 
which are groups of union and employer representatives, who are 
unlikely to have JDs.206 While we cannot ascertain precisely from the 
awards whether a particular arbitrator does or does not have a JD, we 
                                               
 200. Id. at 831. 
 201. Id. at 830. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Picher, Seeber & Lipsky, supra note 49, at 12; see also Allen & Jennings, supra 
note 173, at 423 (reporting that a 1987 survey of 296 NAA members found that 51% 
of respondents possessed a law school education); J. Timothy Sprehe & Jeffrey 
Small, Members and Nonmembers of the National Academy of Arbitrators: Do They Differ?, 
39 ARB. J. 25, 27–28 (1984) (reporting that a 1983 survey of NAA members and 
nonmembers found that 54.3% of 1,040 arbitrators on the national AAA list of labor 
arbitrators held a law degree). 
 205. LAURA J. COOPER ET AL., MORE THAN WE HAVE EVER KNOWN ABOUT DISCIPLINE 
AND DISCHARGE IN LABOR ARBITRATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 7, 22 (2015). 
 206. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 46, at 255 n.83. 
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know the service provider, such as AAA or FMCS, and therefore 
whether there is a higher likelihood a particular arbitrator has a JD.207 
Relatedly, perhaps having attorney representation of the parties in 
the arbitration increases the likelihood of the arbitrator citing external 
authority. Attorneys may be more likely than other union or management 
representatives to cite external authority to the arbitrator, and so the 
arbitrators are more likely to cite it themselves. 
To address these and other questions, we created a new database of 
labor arbitration awards. This is our first article examining the awards 
in the newly created database. Prior studies examining labor arbitration 
awards and their use of external authority have primarily used awards 
published in BNA Labor Arbitration Reports.208 Other studies have 
surveyed members of the NAA.209 We intend to use the data from our 
distinct set of awards to supplement the findings of others based on 
different data sets. Our data set includes AAA awards, awards from 
other services providers, and those from other selection processes. 
While some of the cases may have been published by BNA, some most 
likely were not.210 
Our labor arbitration awards are drawn from the Public Access to 
Court Electronic Records federal court electronic docket (PACER). 
We searched on Bloomberg in the PACER database for “employ! and 
(arbitral /2 award).” We included all federal district court cases from 
2000 to 2011 where the nature of the suit was classified as any of the 
following: Civil Rights - Disabilities - Employment [445]; Civil Rights - 
Employment [442]; Labor - Fair Labor Standards Act [710]; Labor - 
Family and Medical Leave Act [751]; Labor - Labor/Management 
Relations [720]; Labor - Labor/Management Reporting & Disclosure 
[730]; Labor - Other Litigation [790]; Other Statutes - Arbitration 
[896]. We used the broad search term in order to find all cases involving 
an arbitration award that dealt with employment or employers. 
A research assistant examined each docket in all of the resulting 
cases from the years 2000 to 2006 and the docket in each fourth case 
in our results for the years 2007 to 2011 to ascertain whether the case 
                                               
 207. Because our data set contains the names of the arbitrators, a follow-up study 
could research whether each arbitrator had a JD and compare the use of external law 
specifically to educational background. 
 208. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 199, at 810; Oppenheimer & LaVan, supra note 
66, at 13. 
 209. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 133, at 70; Picher, Seeber & Lipsky, supra note 49. 
 210. BNA only publishes awards that arbitrators send them with the permission of 
both parties. Levinson, supra note 199, at 811. 
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involved an arbitration award and whether the arbitration award at 
issue in the case was available.211 Due to limited time and resources, we 
used sampling for results from 2007 to 2011 because there were over 
200 cases in each of those years. A case was considered off point if it 
involved arbitration but not an award, such as a case where arbitration 
was compelled by the court’s decision, or a case that involved arbitration 
of a non-employment-related issue. The research assistants coded each 
available award in the on-point cases for different information, 
including citation to external authority. For this article, we narrowed 
the database to include only labor arbitration awards, excluding 
employment arbitration awards, by including only those cases where 
the party opposing the employer212 was a union or where the claim type 
was a breach of a CBA. Our new database of labor arbitration awards 
consists of 602 awards. 
No dataset of awards is perfectly representative. Because arbitration 
is a private process, obtaining all labor arbitration awards for a certain 
period or obtaining a truly randomly-selected sample is not possible. 
Instead, if we want to provide any empirical evidence about labor 
arbitration, and arbitration more generally, we must use a non-
representative sample and acknowledge the limitations of the data set. 
Because arbitration plays an increasingly important role in legal 
dispute resolution, we believe having empirical data and acknowledging 
its limitations is preferable to having no data at all, and that research 
using such data can still yield valuable results. 
Our new data set overcomes some of the acknowledged limitations 
of the samples of arbitration awards used by previous authors, but has 
limitations of its own. Data published by BNA Labor Arbitration Reports 
has been a main source used in the study of labor arbitration.213 But 
BNA only publishes awards when the arbitrator obtains the permission 
of the parties and sends BNA the award.214 Some arbitrators elect not 
                                               
 211. Thirty research assistants examined the dockets over a five-year period. 
Especially for cases in 2000 and 2001, the award is often not available in the electronic 
database, and we did not have funding to obtain the actual court files with the paper 
copies of the awards. 
 212. Per our coding, the union might also oppose a trust fund or other entity, 
guaranteeing that we had all arbitration awards involving unions. 
 213. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 199, at 811 (using BNA reports for a study on 
employment discrimination claims in labor arbitration); Oppenheimer & LaVan, supra 
note 66, at 13 (using BNA reports for a study on discrimination disputes in labor 
arbitration). 
 214. Levinson, supra note 199, at 811. 
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to publish their awards or to publish only certain awards.215 Unlike 
BNA, our database includes awards that the parties did not elect to 
publish, including awards by joint arbitration boards. Our data come 
from PACER, a system for all federal district court cases in the nation 
that provides access to every document electronically filed in each 
case.216 Our database does not include any awards that were not 
involved in a court case, indicating that we do not have many of the 
awards where both parties were satisfied and complied with the award. 
We do, however, have a significant number of uncontested awards. 
Some of our awards were confirmed without opposition so the parties 
were satisfied. Other awards were used as support for an argument, 
sometimes by other parties, and so likely were complied with by the 
parties involved in the arbitration without litigation. 
Many parties file a case in federal district court when they are 
dissatisfied with an award in an effort to vacate it, although the 
standard for vacating an arbitration award is a difficult one to satisfy.217 
The narrow grounds upon which a labor award can be vacated are 
when: (1) “the award results from procedural unfairness, such as fraud, 
corruption, or bias,” (2) the arbitrator clearly exceeded the authority 
to interpret the CBA by contravening a clear provision, or (3) the 
award itself, not the CBA provision, “violates a fundamental and well-
defined public policy.”218 Because our data set likely overrepresents 
awards with which one party was dissatisfied, we might adjust our 
expectations accordingly. For instance, perhaps awards that cite 
external authority are less likely to be contested because the parties 
perceive them as more authoritative—or perhaps they are more likely 
to be contested because the parties believe external law should not 
have been relied on. 
Our data set includes a substantial number of awards that the parties 
did not dispute. It contains 258 cases, approximately 42.86% of the 
cases, where the award was not challenged.219 Sometimes unions make 
a regular practice of confirming labor awards because they are not self-
                                               
 215. Id. 
 216. PACER, https://www.pacer.gov [https://perma.cc/U2YG-QE4P]. 
 217. WARE & LEVINSON, supra note 4, at 190. 
 218. Id. 
 219. These cases were each coded as 0=no challenge indicated in response to the 
query for CHALLENGE=Grounds for challenge to arbitrator’s award. The resolution 
in these cases ranges from settlement to non-merits dismissal, confirmation of an 
award by default judgment, or confirmation of an award through a mechanism other 
than default judgment. 
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enforcing.220 In these cases, the union files in federal district court to 
confirm the award, and the employer either does not appear, so that a 
default judgment issues, or the employer stipulates to the 
confirmation.221 Our data set also includes cases where one of the 
parties cites to an arbitration award as relevant authority. The prior 
award could deal with the same fact pattern and parties involved in the 
litigation. Or the award could simply be relevant to the court case but 
be between completely different parties than those involved in the 
court case, in the same way a decision from another district court, a 
state court, or an administrative agency might be relevant to the case. 
In the latter category of cases, arbitrators use the award in a manner 
similar to other persuasive authority, and the parties to the arbitration 
did not dispute the outcome of the award. In the former cases, the 
parties did not directly dispute the award either, which we know 
because no one is moving to vacate it; rather, they may disagree over 
whether the court should rule similarly to how the arbitrator ruled in 
the former dispute. These cases that use an award to support an 
argument include cases brought for unlawful employment discrimination 
under Title VII and other anti-discrimination statutes, wage and hour 
cases, FMLA cases, and a broad range of other types of labor and 
employment law disputes, such as those involving whistleblowers, 
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, breach of duty of fair 
representation, due process, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). 
More of the awards in our data set are drawn from later years than 
from earlier years, given our reliance on an electronic database. So, 
our data may demonstrate what was true of labor awards in the mid-
2000s more reliably than what was true in the early 2000s. 
We plan to write additional articles further examining the use of 
external law in the awards in the new dataset. One will examine the use 
of prior labor awards, and another will explore the relationship 
between the citation to external authority in the awards to the 
outcomes in the court litigation. A third will address the general issue 
of the lawlessness of arbitration. 
                                               
 220. See WARE & LEVINSON, supra note 4, at 136. 
 221. Id. at 125–26 n.169, 136, 153 n.79 (giving examples of various arbitration 
outcomes). 
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IV.    THE RESEARCH FINDINGS 
This Part first sets out our findings about how many awards cite to 
external authority, specifically statutes, cases, administrative authority, 
or secondary sources.222 It then looks at whether certain attributes of 
the arbitration proceedings correlate with the citation to external 
authority. Finally, it discusses whether certain types of labor arbitration 
disputes are correlated more highly with citation to external authority. 
A.   Rates of Citation to External Authority 
This section examines the number of awards that cite to external 
authority. 
1. Citation to statutes 
Of the 602 awards in the database, only seventeen cite to, or rely on, 
a statute. This is approximately 2.82% of the cases. Eleven additional 
awards mention a statute but do not address it in the analysis. Five 
awards explicitly decline to address a statutory issue. Overall, 565 
awards, approximately 93.85%, do not mention a statute at all. Figure 
1 represents the percentage breakdowns between awards that mention, 














                                               
 222. Some awards cite to other labor arbitration awards, and we will share these 
findings in an article focused on the use of “precedent” in labor arbitration. 
 223. Four awards are not included in the count because we have only a part of the 
award, and so cannot know whether statutes were cited in the portions of the awards 
we do not have. 





These findings are consistent with the survey responses of arbitrators 
indicating that in most cases they need not consider a statute, often because 
only a contractual breach is at issue.224 Despite the acknowledgement by 
labor arbitration authorities that reliance on statutes has increased over 
the years,225 our data indicate that during the 2000s, in the vast majority 
of cases, arbitrators did not cite to statutes. While other studies of 
awards have found much higher percentages of awards relying on 
statutes, those studies exclusively addressed situations of prohibited 
discrimination, such as on the basis of race or sex,226 or cases known to 
have raised an NLRA issue.227 
                                               
 224. See Allen & Jennings, supra note 173, at 428 (reporting responses to arbitrator 
questionnaires); St. Antoine, supra note 67, at 189–90 (examining arbitrators’ 
questionnaire responses on using external law in determinations). 
 225. See Malin & Vonhof, supra note 187, at 232 (discussing the impact of the FMLA 
on labor arbitration); Wolkinson & Liberson, supra note 66, at 44 (analyzing 
arbitrators’ willingness to incorporate Title VII in award determinations). 
 226. See Oppenheimer & LaVan, supra note 66, at 13 (finding 60% of 86 BNA labor 
arbitration awards from 1970 to 1975 that dealt with discrimination cited a federal or 
state statute or EEOC guidelines). 
 227. See Greenfield, supra note 161, at 689 (finding 51.9% of 106 labor arbitration 
awards related to NLRB cases from 1981 to 1985 cited “relevant statutory provisions” 




Citation to Statutes (N=602)
No statute cited (N=565)
Cited but ignored (N=11)
Cited and followed (N=17)
Cited but not followed (N=5)
Unknown (N=4)
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Our data also indicate that in very few awards, just five in total, 
arbitrators explicitly followed the Meltzer approach and declined to 
address a statutory issue.228 In another handful of cases, eleven awards 
mention a statute but do not apply it. One of the parties likely 
mentioned a statute, but the arbitrator did not address it in the award’s 
reasoning. One possible reason is that the arbitrator decided not to 
apply external authority without explicitly so stating, but another is 
that the arbitrator could decide the case without needing to reach the 
statutory issue or that a party cited the statute as persuasive authority 
on a non-statutory issue.229 
2. Citation to cases 
As shown in Figure 2, seventy-eight, or approximately 12.96%, of the 







                                               
 228. See Meltzer, supra note 15, at 557 (asserting that arbitrators should follow the 
contract over external law). 
 229. An interesting follow-up would be to pull and read these eleven awards to 
determine why the arbitrators did not explicitly address the statute. 
 230. The coding for cases indicated whenever a case was cited or relied on by an 
arbitrator. For example, if an arbitrator used a well-known case name, such as 
McDonnell Douglas, that would be included in the count. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The same is true for administrative sources and secondary 
sources. We use the word “cite” as shorthand throughout the Article for the findings 
reporting whether awards cited or relied on these sources. Three awards are not 
included in the count because we have only a part of the award, and so cannot know 
whether opinions were cited in the portions of the awards we do not have. 





We were initially surprised by the relatively low number of awards 
that cite to a court opinion because we had anticipated a percentage 
closer to 25% based on Weidemaier’s study of 208 awards published in 
BNA Labor Arbitration Reports.231 That study reported that 101 of the 208 
cases (48.6%) cited to either an arbitration award or judicial 
opinion.232 Of those 101, 55.4% cited a judicial opinion, leading us to 
conclude that 56 of the 208, approximately 27% of the total, cited to a 
judicial opinion.233 The difference may reflect that published awards 
are more likely than unpublished awards to cite to judicial opinions or 
may be caused by different types of cases in the two data sets. Weidemaier’s 
data set included 137 discipline or discharge cases (approximately 65.87%) 
and seventy-one other cases.234 Our data set includes 208 discipline or 
discharge cases235 (approximately 34.55%) and 394 other cases, and, 
                                               
 231. See Weidemaier, supra note 10, at 1112–14. 
 232. Id. at 1145 tbl.A-1. 
 233. See id. 
 234. See id. at 1105 tbl.1. 
 235. Coded among cases where a collective bargaining agreement is allegedly 
breached as involving a just-cause provision (states employees can be disciplined only 




Citation to Cases (N=602)
No cases cited (N=521)
Case cited or relied on (N=78)
Unknown (N=3)
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surprisingly, we did find that cases asserting a breach of a just-cause 
provision correlate with higher citation to external authority.236 
The awards in our database that cite judicial opinions cite an average 
of 3.68 opinions each, with a median citation of two cases. The average 
is consistent with Weidemaier’s finding that twenty-five BNA labor award 
cases citing external authority cited an average of 3.9 judicial opinions.237 
Fifty of the seventy-seven,238 approximately 64.9%, cite more than 
one judicial decision, while twenty-seven, 35%, cite only one judicial 
opinion. The highest number of judicial opinions cited by an award in 
our dataset is twenty. We believe these statistics are consistent with 
Weidemaier’s conclusion, based on a close review of citation practices, 
that citation to judicial opinions, while not widespread, “plays more 
than a trivial role” in labor arbitration.239 
3. Citation to administrative authority 
Figure 3 shows that of the 602 awards, twenty-three awards, 
approximately 3.82%, cite to administrative authority, such as EEOC 






                                               
 236. See infra Table 9. 
 237. Weidemaier, supra note 10, at 1120, 1121 tbl.3. 
 238. The number of awards that cite a judicial opinion is seventy-seven, rather than 
seventy-eight, because there is one partial award citing at least one judicial opinion 
where the actual number of opinions cited in the full award is unknown. This award is 
excluded from the count. 
 239. Weidemaier, supra note 10, at 1121. 
 240. Four awards are not included in the count because we have only a part of the 
award, and so cannot know whether administrative sources were cited in the portions 
of the awards we do not have. 





Scholars recognize that citation of administrative authority is an 
important indicator, like citation of statutes and judicial opinions, of 
whether arbitrators consider external authority.241 Administrative 
authority relates to a wide variety of employment-related disputes in a 
similar way to judicial opinions, and our study provides a new data 
point as to how often labor awards cite to administrative authority. 
Only two prior studies have looked specifically at the rate at which 
labor arbitration awards cite to administrative authority. Greenfield’s 
study found that fourteen of the 106 awards, approximately 13%, cited 
to NLRB decisions,242 and Levinson’s study found that thirteen of 111 
awards, approximately 11.71%, cited to EEOC guidelines.243 These 
studies focused on cases alleging discrimination or a violation of the 
NLRA, likely accounting for our finding that a lower percentage of 
labor awards, drawn from all types of cases, cite to or rely on administrative 
authority.244 
                                               
 241. See, e.g., Oppenheimer & LaVan, supra note 66, at 13 (presenting findings that 
60% of arbitration awards in their study cited statutes or EEOC guidelines); Wolkinson 
& Liberson, supra note 66, at 44 (noting it is “not unusual” for arbitrators to adopt 
decisions of the EEOC in sex discrimination arbitration). 
 242. Greenfield, supra note 161, at 689 tbl.1, 692. 
 243. Levinson, supra note 199, at 830. 
 244. See Greenfield, supra note 161, at 689 tbl.1, 692; Levinson, supra note 199, at 830. 
95.51%
3.82% 0.66%
Citation to Adminstrative Sources (N=602)
No administrative sources cited
(N=575)
Administrative sources cited or
relied on (N=23)
Unknown (N=4)
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4. Citation to secondary sources 
As shown in Figure 4, of the 602 awards, seventy-nine awards, 




Again, only two studies examine the use of secondary sources by 
labor arbitrators. Edwards’ survey found that 52% of labor arbitrators 
reviewed labor advance sheets.246 Levinson found that seventeen of 111 
labor arbitration awards, approximately 15.32%, cited secondary sources.247 
That study focused on discrimination cases, and so the finding that a 
similar percentage of the current database of awards, of which many 
are solely breach of contract cases unrelated to any statutory claims, 
                                               
 245. Four awards are not included in the count because we have only a part of the 
award, and so cannot know whether secondary sources were cited in the portions of 
the awards we do not have. 
 246. Edwards, supra note 133, at 71. Advance sheets would summarize recent court 
and administrative decisions. See UNIV. OF IDAHO COLL. OF LAW, Employment & Labor 
Law, https://www.uidaho.edu/-/media/UIdaho-Responsive/Files/law/library/legal-
research/guides/employment-labor-law.pdf [https://perma.cc/6URW-XKD2] 
(describing advance sheets as a common feature of employment and labor law 
reporters). 




Citation to Secondary Sources (N=602)
No secondary sources cited
(N=519)
Secondary sources cited or
relied on (N=79)
Unknown (N=4)
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has a similar percentage of awards with citations to secondary sources 
is interesting.248 
We included citation to secondary sources because some courts rely 
on secondary sources for established principles of law, and arbitrators 
likely do also. We hypothesize that arbitrators may rely on secondary 
sources to a greater extent than some courts do for a variety of reasons, 
such as not having as extensive access to judicial opinions, not being 
attorneys and so relying on summaries provided by attorneys, or having 
more limited time. 
We note that for the focus of this article on whether arbitration 
awards cite to authority external to the contract, as relevant to the 
debate over whether arbitrators should follow the law and not just the 
contract, we chose to focus on citation to statutes, judicial opinions, 
and administrative authority, rather than to other labor arbitration 
awards.249 The citation to secondary sources variable may be overinclusive 
because it includes secondary sources that summarize labor arbitration 
awards as well as those that summarize statutory law, including judicial 
opinions and administrative authority. 
5. Overall citation to external authority 
Of the 602 awards, ninety-nine awards, approximately 16.4%, cite to 
at least one statute, judicial opinion, or administrative authority. 503 
awards, more than 83%, cite no external authority, other than possibly 
a secondary authority. 
Our finding of 17% is substantially different from previous authors’ 
findings. In 1979, Oppenheimer and LaVan found that 60% of labor 
arbitration awards in her sample cited a statute or regulation,250 and 
Greenfield found that 51.9% of labor arbitration awards addressed 
statutory issues.251 Even Zirkel’s study, which was not limited to awards 
involving discrimination, concluded that a third of the cases did not 
involve external authority,252 a much lower percentage than the more 
than 83% we find cite no external authority. Again, because those 
studies focused on discrimination and cases alleging an NLRA 
violation,253 the lower number in our study may be due to the larger 
number of cases in the data set that are purely contractual disputes 
                                               
 248. Id. 
 249. Cf. Zirkel, supra note 155, at 31 nn.8–9. 
 250. Oppenheimer & LaVan, supra note 66, at 13. 
 251. Greenfield, supra note 161, at 689. 
 252. Zirkel, supra note 155, at 45. 
 253. Greenfield, supra note 161, at 689; Oppenheimer & LaVan, supra note 66, at 13. 
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that do not relate to statutory law. The 17% appears to be in line with 
the survey findings that most labor arbitrators do not find statutory law 
relevant in most disputes,254 and that some do not apply statutory law 
unless asked to do so by the parties.255 As reported, some likely do not 
consider external authority even in situations where the CBA conflicts 
with the law.256 
Of the awards citing external authority—at least one statute, judicial 
opinion, or administrative authority—the majority cite only judicial 
opinions. Of the ninety-nine awards, sixty-seven awards, approximately 
67.7%, cite only one or more judicial opinions, and no statute or 
administrative authority. Thirteen of the ninety-nine awards, approximately 
13%, cite more than one of the three types of external authority—statute, 
judicial opinion, and administrative authority. Three of the awards cite a 
statute and one or more judicial opinions, and one cites a statute and 
one or more administrative documents. Only seven of the ninety-nine 
awards cite only a statute. 
Overall, the raw numbers point to Meltzer as the winner of the 
debate, at least as a positive matter; most arbitrators do not cite to 
external authority in the majority of the cases in our data set. Looking 
at sheer numbers does not disclose the subset of the cases, if any, in 
which the law would have required a different outcome than the 
contract, and does not answer the overarching question of whether 
arbitrators should consider external authority. There are only five 
cases in our data set where we know that the arbitrator explicitly 
declined to follow a statute mentioned in the award, and only another 
                                               
 254. Allen & Jennings, supra note 173, at 428 (stating that “[i]n the majority of 
arbitration cases,” the law has no bearing on the dispute, and many neutrals believe 
they should “restrict themselves merely to examination of the labor agreement”); 
Edwards, supra note 133, at 79 (“Nearly two thirds of the responding arbitrators . . . 
believed that an arbitrator has no business interpreting or applying a public statute in 
a contractual grievance dispute.”); St. Antoine, supra note 67, at 189 (explaining that 
around 60% of respondents noted they “seldom feel required to deal with the issue of 
contract versus law because . . . the vast majority of contracts should and can be 
interpreted as consistent with the law”). 
 255. See Edwards, supra note 133, at 79 (“97[%] . . . agreed that an arbitrator should 
consider public law when the parties have, by submission, conferred jurisdiction upon 
[the arbitrator] to decide the contract issue in light of the applicable federal or state 
law.”); St. Antoine, supra note 67, at 189 (stating that roughly half of responding 
arbitrators cite to external law only if the parties have cited legal authorities). 
 256. St. Antoine, supra note 67, at 190 (stating that “almost twice as many arbitrators 
said they would follow the contract [when law and contract irreconcilably conflict] . . . 
as said they would follow the law,” unless otherwise instructed by the parties). 
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eleven mention a statute that was not relied on. So, we cannot conclude 
that arbitrators follow Meltzer “hands down.” 
Indeed, awards are citing external authority in a significant minority 
of cases. And further examination of the data may disclose that the 
cases that do not cite external authority are the type that focus on 
contractual claims that are unrelated to statutory law and that the 
awards may use a sensible reasoning process to interpret the CBAs 
without citation to external authority. The data regarding the relatively 
low percentage of awards that cite external authority does not upend 
Weidemaier’s conclusion, upon his closer look at a subset of the 
awards, that “the awards do not remotely resemble what one would 
expect from a system of ad hoc, purely discretionary adjudication.”257 
A closer analysis and further study are clearly warranted. 
B.   Attributes of the Arbitration Proceeding that May Affect the Likelihood of 
Citation to External Authority 
We are aware that some possibly large percentage of labor arbitrators 
do not have JDs,258 and that it may be less likely for someone who is not 
trained as an attorney to cite external authority. Only one study of 
labor arbitration, the Oppenheimer and LaVan study of discrimination 
cases from 1979, looked for a correlation between arbitrators having 
JDs and citing to external authority, and found that “[w]hether the 
arbitrator was a lawyer” was not “significantly related to whether the 
arbitrator cited law, judicial decisions, arbitration, or past practice.”259 
Our data reflect whether there was a service provider, and, if so, 
which provider, for each award. A certain portion of labor arbitrations 
are decided by joint grievance boards, an arbitrator named in the 
contract, or an arbitrator selected by parties.260 These arbitrators are 
more likely to be laypeople with experience in the industry than JDs.261 
On the other hand, many labor arbitrations take place under the 
auspices of the AAA or the FMCS, and these services are likely to have 
a higher number of arbitrators who have JDs on their lists, though not 
                                               
 257. Weidemaier, supra note 10, at 1121. 
 258. Picher, Seeber & Lipsky, supra note 49, at 12 (finding 61.4% of NAA arbitrators 
in 1999 had a law or JD degree). 
 259. Oppenheimer & LaVan, supra note 66, at 16. 
 260. See supra Section I.B. 
 261. See generally Nolan-Haley supra note 46, at 255 n.83. 
1866 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:1827 
 
all have JDs.262 Our data on service providers can serve as an imprecise 
proxy for whether an arbitrator has a JD.263 
This section first sets out the data about whether using a service 
provider at all or using a particular service provider correlates with 
citation to external authority. Second, it examines whether arbitrations 
where one or both parties are represented by attorneys are more likely 
to result in awards that cite external authority. 
1. Service provider relation to citation to external authority 
Overall, the data set contains seventy cases decided by a AAA-
appointed arbitrator, and eighty-seven cases decided by a FMCS-
appointed arbitrator. The data set also contains one case decided by a 
JAMS-appointed arbitrator, thirty-eight cases decided by a state service-
appointed arbitrator, one court-appointed arbitration, two National 
Mediation Board appointed arbitrators, and one arbitrator appointed 
by a privately-owned service in Hawaii. The data set contains 402 
awards where no service provider is indicated. 
Table 1 shows the breakdown of these numbers for service providers 
as between cases citing to external authority (a statute, judicial opinion, 
or administrative authority) and those citing no external authority.264 
  
                                               
 262. Weidemaier, supra note 10, at 1136 n.186. 
 263. We have all the names of the arbitrators, and a fruitful area for future research 
would be to look up each arbitrator and whether they have a JD to test the hypothesis 
that those with JDs are more likely to cite external authority. 
 264. The three partial awards that do not contain any citation to authority in the 
portions available are included in this count as citing no external authority. 








No Service Provider 
(n=402) 47 47.47% 355 70.58% 
AAA (n=70) 20 20.20% 50 9.94% 
FMCS (n=87) 21 21.21% 66 13.12% 
JAMS (n=1) 1 1.01% 0 0.00% 
State Service (n=38) 8 8.08% 30 5.96% 
Court 
ordered/annexed 
(n=1) 1 1.01% 0 0.00% 
National Mediation 
Board (n=2) 1 1.01% 1 0.20% 
Dispute Prevention & 
Resolution, Inc. (n=1) 0 0.00% 1 0.20% 
Total (n=602) 99 100.00% 503 100.00% 
 
Of 503 awards that cite no external authority (statute, judicial 
opinion, or administrative authority), 355 awards, approximately 
70.58%, are awards with no service provider indicated. In sixty-six of 
the awards, approximately 13.12%, the FMCS was used, and in fifty 
awards, approximately 9.94%, the AAA was used. 
Of the ninety-nine awards that cite to some type of external authority 
(statute, judicial opinion, or administrative authority), forty-seven 
awards, approximately 47.47%, have no service provider indicated. 
Twenty-one awards, approximately 21.21%, are FMCS cases, and 
twenty cases, approximately 20.20%, are AAA cases. 
The data set has a large proportion of AAA cases and non-AAA cases, 
both those that do and do not cite to external authority. It includes 
FMCS awards, which, like AAA, has experienced arbitrators on the 
roster,265 but it also includes cases where no service provider was used, 
which should include some less-experienced arbitrators and joint 
                                               
 265. See Information on Joining the Arbitration Roster, FED. MEDIATION & CONCILIATION 
SERV., https://www.fmcs.gov/services/arbitration/information-joining-arbitrator-roster 
[https://perma.cc/Q2SH-4Q6C] (requiring arbitrators to submit recent arbitration 
award decisions or complete a class to become a FMCS arbitrator); AM. ARBITRATION 
ASS’N, Qualification Criteria for Admittance to the AAA Labor Panel, https://www.adr.org/ 
sites/default/files/document_repository/Labor_QualificationsCriteria_AAAPanel.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D3C5-N7V8]. 
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arbitration boards of non-attorneys who work in the industry, as well as 
more experienced arbitrators. 
When comparing the seventy AAA awards to the eighty-seven FMCS 
awards, we find no statistically significant difference between the rate 
at which the awards cite external authority, approximately 28.57% and 
24.14% respectively. When comparing the 402 awards in the data base 
where no service provider is indicated to those that were authored by 
an arbitrator assigned by the AAA or FMCS, we find that a statistically 
significant greater number of awards authored by those assigned by 
one of the service providers cite to external authority. Only 
approximately 11.69% of the awards without a service provider cite to 
external authority. 
Table 2 reflects the numbers and percentages of awards that do and 
do not cite external authority for the cases where no service provider 
was indicated in comparison to the cases with AAA-appointed and 
FMCS-appointed arbitrators. A two-tailed T-test run on STATA was used 
to determine whether the differences were statistically significant for 
each of the findings reported in this Article. 
Table 2 
 External Authority 
No External 
Authority 
No Service Provider 
(N=402) 47 11.69% 355 88.31% 
AAA 
(N=70) 20 28.57% 50 71.43% 
FMCS 
(N=87) 21 24.14% 66 75.86% 
Note: There is statistically significant difference in the citation to 
external authority between no service provider and AAA (at the 1% 
level) and between no service provider and FMCS (at the 1% 
level), but there is not a statistically significant difference in the 
citation to external authority between AAA and FMCS. 
 
Approximately 30.10% of the awards where no service provider was 
used, 121 of 402 awards, were decided by joint boards or similar groups 
of industry experts rather than a traditional arbitrator or panel of 
arbitrators. Of those 121 awards, fifty-two, approximately 43%, contained 
only the award with no opinion or explanation. In contrast, of those 281 
awards decided by a neutral arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators, only 
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eight, approximately 3%, contained only the award with no opinion or 
explanation. This difference contributes to the lower likelihood of 
citation to external authority in the non-administered cases.  Even 
when we compare only the 281 awards decided by an arbitrator or a 
panel of arbitrators, and exclude the 121 decided by a joint board, the 
AAA and FMCS-appointed arbitrators are more likely than those not 
appointed by a service provider to cite external authority, as reflected 
in Table 3. Forty-five, approximately 16.01% of the awards indicating no 
service provider cite to external authority, whereas twenty, approximately 
28.57% of the AAA awards, and twenty-one, approximately 24.14% of the 








No Service Provider, 
Individual or Panel 
Arbitrator 
(N=281) 45 16.01% 236 83.99% 
AAA 
(N=70) 20 28.57% 50 71.43% 
FMCS 
(N=87) 21 24.14% 66 75.86% 
Note: There is statistically significant difference in the citation to 
external authority between no service provider using an individual 
or panel arbitrator and AAA (at the 5% level) and between no 
service provider using an individual or panel arbitrator and FMCS 
(at the 1% level). 
 
The higher rate at which AAA and FMCS-appointed arbitrators cite 
external authority may reflect that arbitrators with a legal education 
are more likely than industry experts and other arbitrators, without a 
J.D., to cite external authority. Other possible explanations for the 
greater likelihood of citation of external authority in awards indicating 
AAA or FMCS were used by the parties are the following. The parties 
using service providers are willing to pay more money, indicated by 
payment for the service of the provider, and are willing to compensate 
representatives and the arbitrator for time spent on legal research. The 
joint boards and some other awards where no service provider is 
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indicated may be used in situations that are industry and fact-specific 
or require a quick decision (such as in hours or days rather than weeks 
or months), so that legal authority reasonably is routinely not 
considered. The ethical and other requirements for appearing on the 
roster of a service provider may mean that those arbitrators are more 
likely to cite authority than others not bound by such rules or 
qualifications.266 
2. Attorney representation relation to citation to external authority 
Common sense suggests that awards resulting from hearings where 
attorneys represent one or more parties might contain more external 
authority references because attorneys have been trained to cite 
authority and regularly do so in administrative proceedings and court. 
They therefore are more likely than non-attorneys to cite statutes, case 
law, and administrative authority to the arbitrator. One of us, however, 
predicted no statistically significant differences based on attorney 
representation similar to the finding that legally trained and non-
legally trained arbitrators have no difference in citation practice in 
discrimination cases.267 Additionally, a past study found that non-
attorneys often effectively represented unions in labor arbitration of 
discrimination claims, which indicates they likely persuasively cite 
relevant authority.268 The author, who has practiced labor law and read 
many labor arbitration awards, believed that human resources officers 
and union business representatives are aware of and competently raise 
external authority when arguing their cases.269 
According to the data, common sense was the better predictor than 
extrapolating from prior studies. As shown in Table 4, of the 384 
awards where at least one party was represented by an attorney,270 
                                               
 266. See supra note 265. 
 267. Oppenheimer & LaVan, supra note 66, at 16; see also Zirkel, supra note 155, at 
41–42 (stating that five awards involving legal authority did not correlate with either 
arbitrators or representatives being attorneys). 
 268. Levinson, supra note 199, at 846 (“The fact that unions pursued approximately 
50[%] of these cases without an attorney indicates that union agents do understand 
legal claims well enough to pursue them through the grievance and arbitration 
processes unassisted.”). 
 269. Id. at 789; Ariana R. Levinson, U. LOUISVILLE, https://louisville.edu/law/faculty 
-staff/faculty-directory/levinson-ariana [https://perma.cc/3LLE-ZYCN]. 
 270. These included cases where representation of the employee or the employer 
was coded as representation by in-house counsel, attorney representation by outside 
counsel, or attorney representation but indeterminate whether counsel was in-house 
or outside counsel. 
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eighty-three, approximately 21.61% cited to external authority, whereas 
of the 110 awards where no party was represented by an attorney,271 
only nine, approximately 8.18%, cited external authority. The difference 
is statistically significant, indicating the presence of an attorney does 








(N=384) 83 21.61% 301 78.39% 
No Attorney 
(N=110) 9 8.18% 101 91.82% 
Note: There is a statistically significant difference in citation to 
external authority when an attorney is involved and citation to 
external authority when no attorney is involved (at the 1% level). 
 
Prior studies found that parties’ citation to external authority 
increases the likelihood that an arbitrator will cite to external 
authority. Edwards’ study suggested that, while the large majority of 
arbitrators believed in theory that they should not consider external 
authority, 97% agreed that they should consider external authority 
“when the parties have, by submission, conferred jurisdiction” to do 
so.272 In other words, when both parties cite applicable law, then the 
arbitrator should consider it. St. Antoine’s survey found that about half 
of the arbitrators will cite external law only if the parties have cited 
legal authorities.273 The current study builds on these findings and 
suggests that parties are more likely to cite to external authority when 
they are represented by attorneys, and the likelihood of citation to 
external authority by arbitrators thereby increases. Other possibilities 
exist; for instance, perhaps arbitrators cite more external authority 
when lawyers represent the parties because they believe the lawyers will 
be more persuaded by authority or better able to understand it. Or 
perhaps lawyers are more likely to represent the parties in types of 
cases in which external authority has relevance to the type of dispute. 
                                               
 271. These included cases where representation of both the employee or the 
employer was coded as either no attorney representation or no appearance. 
 272. Edwards, supra note 133, at 79. 
 273. St. Antoine, supra note 67, at 189. 
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C.   Case Type Relation to Citation of External Authority 
This section explores whether the type of case affects the likelihood 
that arbitrators cite to external authority. First, it discusses whether 
cases involving statutory issues are more likely to cite to external 
authority. Second, it breaks down cases by type in a more nuanced way 
to see if citation to external authority is more likely in certain types of 
claims than in others. 
1. Statutory claims relation to citation to external authority 
Because, by definition, a statutory claim involves statutory authority 
external to the CBA, we predicted that a higher percentage of those 
cases that do cite or refer to external authority than of those that do 
not would be statutory claims. Of the ninety-nine awards that cite to 
external authority, in nine instances, approximately 9.09% of the 
awards, a party asserted a statutory claim. Of the 503 awards that do 
not cite to external authority, in thirty-six instances, approximately 
7.16% of the awards, a party asserts a statutory claim. As expected, the 
percent of cases of those that cite external authority where a party 
asserted a statutory claim is greater than of those that do not cite 
external authority where a party asserted a statutory claim. Surprisingly, 
however, the difference is not statistically significant, possibly because 
of the small number of statutory claims, totaling forty-five. Arbitrators 
addressing statutory claims are probably more likely than those who do 
not to cite to external authority. 
Arbitrators who are not addressing statutory claims also cite external 
authority as demonstrated by the ninety-one out of 100 cases citing 
external authority that do not involve a statutory claim. Approximately, 
91% of the cases citing external authority do not address a statutory 
claim, meaning the large majority of cases citing external authority 
involve claims of breach of CBA. This finding indicates that in some 
cases arbitrators are citing external authority as persuasive even when 
they are not addressing legal claims that depend on external authority. 
Table 5 shows the breakdown between the number of cases citing or 
referring to external authority that involve statutory and non-statutory 
claims, as compared to the breakdown between the number of cases 
not citing or referring to external authority that address statutory and 
non-statutory claims.274 
                                               
 274. The three partial awards that do not contain any citation to authority in the 
portions available are included in the counts for tables in this section as citing no 
external authority. 








External Authority (N=99) 9 9.09% 90 90.91% 
No External Authority 
(N=503) 36 7.16% 467 92.84%  
 
As shown in Table 6, we also examined the number of statutory 
claims that cite external authority compared to the number of non-
statutory claims that cite external authority. We reasoned that perhaps 
the lack of a statistically significant difference reflected in Table 3 
might be because another attribute, other than statutory claim, also 
correlated with citation to external authority. 
Of the forty-five arbitrations where a party asserted a statutory claim, 
nine awards, approximately 20.00%, cite to external authority. Of the 
557 cases where a statutory claim was not brought, ninety awards, 
approximately 16.61%, cite to external authority. While again, as 
expected, external authority is cited more often in arbitrations involving 
a statutory claim, the difference is not statistically significant, perhaps 
because of the small number of cases citing external authority, or 
perhaps because arbitrators are equally likely to cite external authority 
in discharge, or some other type of arbitration case, as they are in those 
involving statutory claims. 
Table 6 




9 20.00% 36 80.00% (N=45) 
No Statutory Claim 
90 16.16% 467 83.84% (N=557) 
 
Because of the small number of awards addressing a statutory claim 
(forty-five), we were unable to ascertain whether or not arbitrators of 
different types of statutory claims, such as Title VII versus ERISA, were 
more likely to cite external authority. No award citing external 
authority involved ERISA, however, and twenty-one of those which cite 
no external authority involved ERISA. We would not expect ERISA 
cases that involve an employer’s failure to pay into an ERISA-governed 
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benefit fund to cite external authority because normally the union or 
trust funds need only to prove the failure to pay and the amount owed, 
which does not require reliance on authority.275 Indeed, examples in 
this data set are several cases where a default arbitration award was 
entered by the arbitrator and at least one case where the employer did 
not appear, and the arbitrator entered an award based on the evidence 
provided by the Labor Management Cooperation Committee. As 
shown in Table 7, when we exclude these twenty-one ERISA cases from 
the thirty-six awards addressing statutory claims that do not cite 
authority, the likelihood of arbitrators citing external authority in cases 
involving statutory claims becomes statistically significant, consistent 








9 37.50% 15 62.50% (N=24) 
No Statutory Claim 
90 16.16% 467 83.84% (N=557) 
 
Based on this analysis, we conclude, that labor arbitrators more often 
cite external authority in cases involving a statutory claim than in those 
involving a contractual breach. With a case involving a breach of a 
CBA, arbitrators need not cite legal authority because there is no 
analogous non-contract claim, particularly because most employees 
are employed at will without any contractual protections as to their 
conditions of employment. With a case involving a statutory claim, 
arbitrators will cite external authority because that type of claim by 
definition involves a statute and is a type of claim on which courts and 
administrative agencies will have ruled and provided authority. The 
analysis also reveals that in a large number of non-statutory cases, 
arbitrators are going beyond the necessary analysis to cite external 
authority. 
                                               
 275. See James P. Baker & Emily L. Garcia-Yow, ERISA’s New Playground, 28 BENEFITS 
L.J. 1, 9 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & 
Accident Ins., 571 U.S. 99, 108 (2013)) (noting that once an ERISA plan is established, 
“the administrator’s duty is to see the plan is ‘maintained pursuant to [that] written 
instrument’”). 
 276. *** Indicates statistically significant difference at the 1% level. 
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These findings support Allen and Jennings conclusion that “[i]n the 
majority of arbitration cases,” the law has no bearing on the issue and 
many arbitrators believe that they should “restrict themselves merely 
to examination of the labor agreement.”277 Yet, in ninety of 557 awards 
that did not involve a statutory issue, approximately 16.16%, labor 
arbitrators cited external authority. That is a significant minority, 
supporting the theory of Mittenthal and, more recently, Malin, that 
arbitrators must, in some cases, consider external authority.278 The 
finding also supports St. Antoine’s findings that: 
• About half of the arbitrators will cite external law only if the 
parties have cited legal authorities.279 
• About 30% of the arbitrators will cite external law, even if the 
parties have not, when “it seems especially pertinent.”280 
• Almost 60% “would not order a party to violate external law as 
part of their award.”281 
2. Type of claims relation to citation of external authority 
We also examined whether certain types of claims, although not 
statutory, constitute a higher percentage of those cases that do cite to 
external authority than of those that do not. One of us expected that 
cases dealing with nondiscrimination provisions would be more likely 
to cite to external authority than those dealing with the contractually 
based right of just cause for discipline, for example. A large body of 
law dealing with Title VII and similar state anti-discrimination laws 
exists for arbitrators to draw upon;282 whereas there are fewer cases 
addressing just cause outside of the labor context, and cause in the 
context of breach of individual contracts is less likely to be interpreted 
in the same way.283 Cases dealing with seniority provisions might also 
                                               
 277. Allen & Jennings, supra note 173, at 428. 
 278. Malin, supra note 16, at 14; Mittenthal, supra note 91, at 42. 
 279. St. Antoine, supra note 67, at 189. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. at 190. 
 282. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 859 (8th ed. 2015). 
 283. Only two U.S. jurisdictions, Montana and Puerto Rico have a good cause rather 
than an at-will default governing employment. See id. (“Montana is unique among the 
50 states in its statutory requirement of just cause for termination.”); Fisher Phillips, 
Employment Law in Puerto Rico: Employees’ Rights and Employers’ Obligations, CROSS BORDER 
EMPLOYER BLOG (Apr. 21, 2011), https://www.fisherphillips.com/Cross-Border-Em 
ployer/Employment-Law-in-Puerto-Rico-Employeese28099-Rights-and-
Employerse28099-Obligations [https://perma.cc/5HGP-V3SS] (“Employers in Puerto 
Rico are required to have ‘just’ or ‘good cause’ to discharge employees hired for an 
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be more likely to cite external authority to the extent that FMLA leave 
is implicated.284 
As shown in Table 8, overall there were eighty-eight of the ninety-
nine awards citing external authority that alleged a breach of a CBA, 
and 447 of the 503 awards not citing external authority that alleged a 
breach of a CBA, for a total of 565 breach of CBA cases in the database. 
We specifically coded for whether the breach alleged was a breach of a 
just-cause provision, a nondiscrimination provision, or a seniority 
provision. (The other awards addressed issues such as non-unit 
employees performing work, including subcontracting cases, failure to 
pay into a fringe benefit fund, other benefits issues, including leave, 








Agreement Breach  
(N=565) 
88 15.58% 477 84.42% 
No Collective Bargaining 
Agreement Breach  
(N=37) 
11 28.95% 26 68.42% 
 
Contrary to our expectations, and as shown in Table 9, none of the 
cases citing external authority involved a non-discrimination provision, 
and only four of those that did not cite external authority involved a 
non-discrimination provision. The data does not indicate external 
authority is more likely to be cited in breach of nondiscrimination 
clause cases than in other cases. Perhaps employees who are able are 
electing to bring administrative charges or lawsuits when they are 
discriminated against rather than pursuing a grievance for breach of a 
non-discrimination clause. Those cases alleging breach of a seniority 
clause were also equally likely to cite or not cite external authority, with 
three of the eighty-eight cases citing external authority involving a 
breach of a seniority provision, and seventeen of the 477 that did not 
cite external authority doing so. There was no statistical difference 
                                               
indefinite period of time . . . .”). Every state has an anti-discrimination law similar to Title 
VII. Rothstein, supra note 282, at 194. 
 284. See Malin & Vonhof, supra note 187, at 234. 
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between the approximately 3.41% and 3.56% of awards in these 
categories. 
As also reflected in Table 9, the cases involving a breach of a just-
cause provision were actually a greater proportion of the awards citing 
external authority than those that did not. One of us had expected the 
reverse to be true because a just-cause provision is a contractual 
guarantee without a statutory equivalent, unlike a clause such as a non-
discrimination clause for which there are many similar statutory 
guarantees of non-discrimination. Most employees are employed at-
will,285 so the union CBA guarantees a greater right to job security than 
that available to most other employees. Forty-three of the eighty-eight 
awards citing external authority, approximately 48.86%, involved a 
breach of a just-cause provision, while 165 of the 477 awards that did 
not cite external authority, approximately 34.59%, involved a breach 
of a just-cause provision. This difference is statistically significant at the 
5% level. Perhaps when a discharge is at issue arbitrators are more 
likely to cite external authority to buttress the strength of their 
decision. In the labor arbitration context, discharge is considered the 
equivalent to “capital punishment,” and employers must follow fair 
procedures and have a very good reason to discharge an employee, so 
arbitrators may wish to explain the outcome extremely thoroughly and 
rely on external authority to do so. 
Table 9286 
 Just Cause** 
Nondisc-
rimination Seniority Other 
External 
Authority 




(N=477) 165 34.59% 4 0.84% 17 3.56% 310 64.99% 
 
                                               
 285. See RAY ET AL., supra note 24, at 33–35 (noting that most employees are 
employed at will and can be discharged for any reason or no reason at all). 
  286. The totals in Tables 9, 10, 11, and 12 are greater than 565 because some awards 
addressing a breach of CBA included multiple claims such as a termination without 
just cause and an additional claim. 
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We performed additional analyses to be very sure that no correlation 
between non-discrimination and seniority cases and citation to 
external authority existed. As shown in Table 10, there was also no 
statistically significant difference between the rate at which non-
discrimination cases and all other claims of breach of collective bargaining 
agreement cite or refer to external authority. There was also no statistically 
significant difference between the rate at which seniority cases and all 
other claims of breach of collective bargaining agreement cite or refer 

























(N=555) 87 15.68% 468 84.32% 
 
As shown in Table 12, additional analyses confirmed that breach of 
just-cause cases are more likely to cite or refer to external authority 
than other types of breach of collective bargaining cases. Forty-three of 
208 just-cause cases, approximately 20.67%, cite to external authority 
while only fifty of 372, approximately 13.44%, of other types of breach 
of CBA cases cite to external authority. The difference is statistically 
significant at the 5% level. 
  









(N=208) 43 20.67% 165 79.33% 
Other Collective 
Bargaining 
Agreement Breach  
(N=372) 50 13.44% 322 86.56% 
Note: the difference between citation to external authority 
between just-cause cases and other CBA cases is significant at the 
5% level.  
 
We coded for cases that involved an adverse action, where an 
employee was punished, terminated, suspended, laid off, forced to 
resign, not promoted, not accommodated, not hired, or denied 
something to which the employee was entitled. Combined, these totaled 
399 of the 602 awards. Seventy-five of the ninety-nine awards that cite 
external authority involved an adverse action. Of the awards that do 
not cite external authority, 324 of the 503 involved an adverse action. 
We expected a greater percentage of cases citing external authority 
would involve harassment and refusals to accommodate. There is a 
wide array of statutory and case law, from Title VII, the ADA, and 
similar state laws, that can be drawn upon to help determine when 
harassment and refusals to accommodate are unlawful. Yet, as shown 
in Table 13, only one of the seventy-five cases citing external authority 
addressed harassment and only two addressed refusal to accommodate, 
approximately 1.33% and 1.85% respectively, of the total awards citing 
external authority. Six of the awards that cite no authority involved 
harassment, approximately 1.85%, and ten involved a refusal to 
accommodate, approximately 3.09%. These differences were not 
statistically significant, suggesting that these case types do not 














(N=75) 1 1.33% 2 2.67% 
No External Authority 
(N=324) 6 1.85% 10 3.09% 
 
We performed further analyses which confirmed that there is no 
correlation between either harassment cases or refusal to accommodate 
and citation or reference to external authority. As shown in Table 14, 
there is no statistically significant difference between the rate at which 
harassment cases, approximately 14.29%, and all other adverse action 
cases, approximately 18.80%, cite or refer to external authority. 
Similarly, as shown in Table 15, there is no statistically significant 
difference between the rate at which refusal to accommodate cases, 
approximately 16.67%, and all other adverse action cases, approximately 








(N=7) 1 14.29% 6 85.71% 
Other Adverse Action 
Alleged  










(N=12) 2 16.67% 10 83.33% 
Other Adverse Action 
Alleged (N=396) 74 18.69% 322 81.31% 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article describes how we have amassed a new data set of labor 
arbitration awards drawn from the PACER database.287 Any subset of 
arbitration awards is not representative because the very nature of 
arbitration is that it is a private alternative to litigation. Unlike court 
documents, which are tracked and publicly available, an award is often 
simply sent to the parties, and so is not tracked in any manner and 
certainly not publicly available. Even the awards tracked by service 
providers like the AAA are not publicly available, and a researcher 
must obtain permission from the AAA to view the awards. Our new data 
set provides an opportunity to analyze hundreds of awards that are not 
selected from BNA published awards as most prior data sets exploring 
citation to external authority in labor arbitration awards have been.288 
We have examined the awards to contribute to a long-standing debate 
over whether arbitrators do and should consider authority external to 
the CBA when deciding labor grievances.289 By extension, the 
examination of the data also bears on the larger and often-debated 
issue of whether arbitration is “lawless.”290 
The data demonstrates that the overwhelming majority of awards do 
not cite to external authority, but only a small number of awards 
explicitly decline to address a statutory issue or do not address a 
statutory issue raised in the award in passing or by one of the parties.291 
In our data set, the largest number of awards that cite no external 
authority, and over 45% of those that do cite external authority, result 
from processes not administered by a service provider.292 We find that 
using the AAA or FMCS correlates with a greater likelihood of awards 
citing to or referencing external authority than awards that results 
from a non-administrated process.293 We also find that representation, 
of one or both parties, by an attorney correlates with a greater 
likelihood of awards citing to or referencing external authority.294 
After extensive analysis, we find the data demonstrates, as 
anticipated, that awards that address a statutory claim are more likely 
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than those that do not to cite to or reference external authority.295 The 
data also indicates that awards addressing claims asserting a breach of 
a just-cause provision are more likely than other types of contractual 
claims to cite to external authority.296 While this result was surprising 
to one of us, one author expected this result, because “just cause” is a 
rather vague term that can benefit from external meaning and 
guidance. 
In short, our study indicates that labor arbitrators often do not 
consult external authority. That said, reliance on external authority 
shows mild indications of nuance, and some factors are more likely to 
cause arbitrators to cite legal authority than others. Perhaps this 
nuance reflects the views of those scholars who believe that today’s 
labor arbitration does not enable or justify the total exclusion of 
external authority. It does seem, though, that Howlett’s views have, to 
date, not been fully embraced in the arbitration context we study here. 
The new data set will provide an opportunity to examine many other 
issues raised by labor arbitration and more generally by arbitration, 
such as whether there is a repeat-player effect, whether attorney 
representation affects win rates, and whether the arbitrator’s and 
parties’ gender affects win rates. We will soon publish a second article 
exploring further the issues the data set raises about potential 
“lawlessness” in labor arbitration. Thereafter, we plan to write two 
articles that focus on the use of “precedent”—previous labor arbitration 
awards—in labor arbitration, and the connection between citation to 
authority and treatment of the awards by the courts. 
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